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This policy brief examines the relationship between urban design and organised crime in Cape Town, arguing that apartheid-era spatial planning created dysfunctional environments that facilitate criminal networks. It discusses how inadequate housing, poor infrastructure, and economic marginalisation allow gangs to act as parallel authorities, and recommends integrating crime prevention strategies into urban planning to reduce the influence of organised crime.

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  • The spatial design of South African cities, rooted in apartheid, intentionally separated races and limited infrastructure in non-white areas, creating 'dormitory' communities and 'dumping grounds' that became growth zones for organised crime.
  • Poor urban planning in townships, characterised by unplanned sprawl and a lack of formal addresses and adequate roads, hinders the ability of the South African Police Service (SAPS) to patrol and respond to emergencies.
  • Organised crime networks exploit housing shortages and economic distress in Cape Town. In some areas, criminals use stolen credit cards to buy building supplies for resale to poor residents, while in suburbs like Belhar, gangs use coercive tactics to buy homes from distressed families at below-market prices and then rent or sell them for profit.
  • In informal settlements, 'shacklords' act as protection racketeers, charging new arrivals fees for sites they do not own. For example, in New Rest at Gugulethu, arrivals may pay R1,000 to a 'local committee' in addition to R1,500 for a shack.
  • Economic opportunity in Cape Town remains concentrated in the CBD and former white suburbs, leaving many marginalised. This lack of formal employment can lead to organised crime becoming a substitute for decent work, and in areas like Khayelitsha, crime is cited as the primary hindrance to small business development.
  • Illegal shebeens have become social hotspots in townships due to a lack of legitimate entertainment and historically unfair alcohol restrictions. Because owners cannot rely on state authorities to resolve disputes, they often employ violence for protection against rivals or gangs.
  • Large-scale 'top-down' infrastructure projects can shift the balance of organised crime. In Delft, violence is often driven by 'turf' wars with criminal leaders actively involved, whereas in established neighbourhoods, leaders typically use recruits for violence.

Cite the original document

APA
Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). polbrief60-119a835e5ce19277.pdf. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief60.pdf
Chicago
Institute for Security Studies. polbrief60-119a835e5ce19277.pdf. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief60.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=polbrief60-119a835e5ce19277.pdf |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief60.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesndpolbrief60119a835e5ce19277pdf, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{polbrief60-119a835e5ce19277.pdf}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief60.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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