ISS PB 58 Mapping Crime Networks in SA 27Jul1000.indd

This policy brief by the Institute for Security Studies argues for a shift in how organised crime is perceived and combated in Southern Africa. It advocates for moving away from rigid, narrow definitions toward a business-centric, network-based approach that recognizes the symbiotic relationships between criminal networks, state officials, and legitimate businesses. The author recommends the adoption of a regional protocol to harmonise legal procedures and the use of social network analysis to better disrupt transnational criminal markets.

• Current perceptions of organised crime in Southern Africa are too narrow and rigid, often relying on United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) definitions that focus on the number of participants and common purpose, thereby ignoring the globalisation and sophistication of modern crime.
• Organised crime should be redefined as a set of core activities—which can be performed by a single person or group—supported by ancillary actors, such as corrupt officials or money launderers, and viewed as an 'illicit enterprise' or 'criminal business'.
• There is a 'loose triangular framework' of interaction between organised crime, the state, and legitimate business. Criminal networks often rely on legitimate business structures to hide activities and on the complicity of political elites to access natural resources like mining, timber, and marine resources, with neo-patrimonial corruption serving as a primary structural driver.
• Transnational criminal networks are highly sophisticated, linking production, transit, and markets across different continents. This is particularly evident in the drug trade, counterfeit goods, and wildlife trafficking, with CITES identifying rhino horn trafficking as one of the most structured criminal activities it faces.
• State sovereignty often hinders the fight against transnational crime because criminal networks do not respect national borders, while law enforcement is constrained by territorial authority. The author suggests that effective disruption requires network analysis that transcends these borders.
• The regulatory landscape in Southern Africa is uneven due to the lack of a regional framework. While South Africa, Mauritius, and Namibia have legislation against organised crime, countries such as Malawi, Lesotho, and Tanzania rely on informal definitions.
• To improve regional responses, the author recommends that member countries of the Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) harmonise strategies, adopt an expanded definition of organised crime, and utilize social network analysis to manage and interpret data.

APA

Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). ISS PB 58 Mapping Crime Networks in SA 27Jul1000.indd. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief58_IDRC.pdf

Chicago

Institute for Security Studies. ISS PB 58 Mapping Crime Networks in SA 27Jul1000.indd. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief58_IDRC.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=ISS PB 58 Mapping Crime Networks in SA 27Jul1000.indd |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief58_IDRC.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesndiss, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{ISS PB 58 Mapping Crime Networks in SA 27Jul1000.indd}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief58_IDRC.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }