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This research paper examines the implementation and challenges of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) across the African continent. It argues that international control mechanisms fail to prioritize specific African concerns, such as the prevention of disease outbreaks, and that African states often lack the resources and political priority to implement necessary national legislation.

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  • The BTWC is significantly less effective in Africa than the CWC because it lacks a dedicated oversight body and verification regime, leaving the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) with a limited mandate and staff of only three people.
  • National legislation for chemical weapons control in Africa is inconsistent; as of 2006, only 16 of 48 listed African states reported having legislation in place, with quality ranging from comprehensive frameworks in South Africa to basic entries in Ethiopia's penal code.
  • Implementation of the BTWC in Africa is poor, with many states failing to submit Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) or attend meetings. By September 2008, only eight African countries had submitted CBMs, with South Africa providing the most at 11 submissions.
  • Africa is uniquely vulnerable to deliberate biological attacks because many organisms used in biological warfare, including anthrax, plague, and botulism toxin, are endemic to the eastern African region, combined with a lack of developed public health infrastructure.
  • There is a significant gap in awareness regarding the BTWC within the African scientific community; many scientists are unaware of the convention's existence or the dual-use risks associated with biotechnology.
  • African states face structural challenges in implementing biosecurity legislation, including a lack of funding, insufficient priority from policymakers, and the difficulty of prosecuting intentional hostile use of biological agents.

Cite the original document

APA
du Rand, A. (2008). Ship without sails. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper171.pdf
Chicago
du Rand, Amelia. Ship without sails. Institute for Security Studies, 2008. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper171.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=du Rand |first1=Amelia |title=Ship without sails |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=November 2008 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper171.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{durand2008ship, author = {du Rand, Amelia}, title = {{Ship without sails}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2008}, month = nov, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper171.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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