CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE DRC DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD (2003–2006)

The document examines the persistence of a 'predatory political and governance culture' in the DRC, tracing it from the colonial era and Mobutu's dictatorship through the 2003–2006 transition. It finds that power-sharing arrangements under the Sun City Agreement effectively removed checks and balances, enabling widespread looting of state assets, mining resources, and public funds. Despite the introduction of new anti-corruption laws and the creation of bodies like the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (CELC), these efforts failed due to a lack of political will, institutional dysfunction, and a reliance on donor-driven initiatives without local ownership.

• The power-sharing arrangement established by the Sun City Agreement undermined good governance by allocating government positions based on political patronage rather than merit, effectively removing institutional checks and balances.
• Corruption in public finance management was characterized by a total disregard for budget estimates and procurement rules, with substantial deficits financed by the Banque Centrale du Congo beyond its statutory limits.
• The mining sector suffered from opaque joint-venture contracts that were often one-sided and disadvantageous to the DRC, with some agreements binding the state for up to 40 years.
• The national army (FARDC) was plagued by 'ghost soldiers' on the payroll, with estimates suggesting 30–55% of soldiers were fictitious, allowing officers to embezzle salary budgets.
• Anti-corruption institutions, such as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (CELC), were dysfunctional due to a lack of expertise, internal infighting, and inadequate funding.
• The legal framework for combating corruption, including the 2005 Anti-Corruption Law and the 2004 money-laundering law, remained largely unenforced due to a lack of political will and judicial incapacity.
• The forestry sector experienced significant illegal activity, with reports that at least three million hectares of logging titles were issued legally, while 15 million hectares were 'exchanged' in violation of the law.
• The 2006 electoral process saw a surge in corruption, including allegations that provincial assembly deputies received up to US$ 50,000 to vote for specific candidates.

APA

KODI, M. (2008). CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE DRC DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD (2003–2006). Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/MONO148FULLBACK.PDF

Chicago

KODI, MUZONG. CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE DRC DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD (2003–2006). Institute for Security Studies, 2008. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/MONO148FULLBACK.PDF.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=KODI |first1=MUZONG |title=CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE DRC DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD (2003–2006) |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=August 2008 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/MONO148FULLBACK.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{kodi2008corruption, author = {KODI, MUZONG}, title = {{CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE DRC DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD (2003–2006)}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2008}, month = aug, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/MONO148FULLBACK.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }