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This report by the Institute for Security Studies analyzes the political and security crisis in Mali following the March 2012 coup d'état. It examines the challenges of the transitional government, the efforts to manage the insurgency in northern Mali, the necessity of rebuilding the Malian army, and the complexities of planning an international military intervention and presidential elections.

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  • The transitional government in Mali is characterized by fragmented power and a skewed relationship favoring the military junta. Despite the formation of a 'government of national unity' on 20 August 2012, governance remains dominated by a three-member structure consisting of junta leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra, and Interim President Dioncounda Traoré, leading to a persistent risk of institutional crisis.
  • Efforts to resolve the crisis in northern Mali involve a strategy of negotiating with groups perceived as 'Malian' and 'simply armed' (such as the MNLA and Ansar Dine) while refusing to negotiate with 'non-Malian' terrorist groups (such as MUJAO and AQIM). However, this distinction is questioned because the divide between armed and terrorist groups is not clear-cut.
  • The Malian army suffered a severe collapse in early 2012 due to systemic poor governance, including nepotism in recruitment, lack of equipment, and the involvement of senior officers in trafficking. This led to low morale, exemplified by the sentiment among soldiers that dying for the country was pointless, and resulted in significant losses, such as the 150 soldiers reportedly killed in Aguelhoc on 24 January 2012.
  • Rebuilding the Malian army requires more than training and equipment; it must address mental health issues, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, and establish disciplinary mechanisms to prevent abuses against civilians. The Military Committee for monitoring the reform of the defence and security forces (CMSRFDS), established in June 2012, is seen as insufficient in its current guidelines to achieve comprehensive security governance reform.
  • Planning for a foreign military intervention has been hindered by a lack of consensus on who constitutes the 'enemy' and tensions between the Malian authorities and ECOWAS. Disagreements centered on the prioritization of the mission, specifically whether to deploy troops in Bamako to secure institutions first or prioritize the reconquest of the north.
  • The UN Security Council has expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of detail in ECOWAS's strategic concepts for the Mali crisis. Resolution 2071 (12 October 2012) opens the way for an 'international military force' and requests a detailed report on the concept of operations, force generation, and financial costs within 45 days.
  • Organizing presidential elections, originally scheduled for 29 April 2012, faces two primary hurdles: the need to revise a discredited voter registration list and the fact that two-thirds of the territory is not under state control. There is a tension between those wanting immediate elections to restore order and those who believe elections are indecent while the country is occupied.

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APA
Théroux-Bénoni, L.-A., Daou, A. F., Toupane, P. M., & Zounmenou, D. (2012). Mali: making peace while preparing for war. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ECOWAS1-ENG.pdf
Chicago
Théroux-Bénoni, Lori-Anne, Awa Faye Daou, Paulin Maurice Toupane, and David Zounmenou. Mali: making peace while preparing for war. Institute for Security Studies, 2012. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ECOWAS1-ENG.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Théroux-Bénoni |first1=Lori-Anne |last2=Daou |first2=Awa Faye |last3=Toupane |first3=Paulin Maurice |last4=Zounmenou |first4=David |title=Mali: making peace while preparing for war |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=October 2012 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ECOWAS1-ENG.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{throuxbnoni2012mali, author = {Théroux-Bénoni, Lori-Anne and Daou, Awa Faye and Toupane, Paulin Maurice and Zounmenou, David}, title = {{Mali: making peace while preparing for war}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2012}, month = oct, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ECOWAS1-ENG.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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