ISS Paper 97

This research paper by the Institute for Security Studies assesses the political transition and disarmament initiatives in Burundi during 2004. It examines the structures established under the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, the challenges of integrating rebel factions into a national army, and the role of international peacekeeping forces in facilitating a peaceful transition to elections.

• The transitional government in Burundi, established under the Arusha Accord, utilized a power-sharing framework between Hutu and Tutsi groups. The transition was divided into two 18-month phases: the first led by Pierre Buyoya (Tutsi) and the second by Domitien Ndayizeye (Hutu), with the vice-president's signature required for certain security decisions in the second phase, granting the UPRONA party blocking power.
• The PALIPEHUTU-FNL faction led by Agathon Rwasa remained a significant obstacle to peace, as it refused to cease fighting and was declared a terrorist group by the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi following the massacre of approximately 160 Congolese-Tutsi refugees at the Gatumba camp.
• The Pretoria Protocol established specific power-sharing quotas for the defence and security sectors, allocating 40 per cent of senior officer positions to the CNDD-FDD of Nkurunziza and setting a police structure of 65 per cent for the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and 35 per cent for the CNDD-FDD.
• The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), deployed on 1 June 2004 with a maximum of 5,650 military personnel, was mandated to monitor ceasefire violations, carry out disarmament and demobilisation, and ensure a secure environment for elections.
• The Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) process faced significant delays due to a lack of resources and political instability. By June 2004, approximately 23,000 ex-combatants were waiting in 11 pre-cantonment centres, where some began deserting due to weariness and poor conditions.
• Funding for the DDR programme was sourced from multiple international donors, including a US$33 million donation from the World Bank and US$45 million from the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). However, World Bank funds remained pending until the TGoB fulfilled conditions such as promulgating a law on donor aid.
• The National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR) proposed a four-year DDR process, but critics like the Centre National de Volontariat au Burundi (CNVB) argued that reintegration is a long-term process requiring more than four years to ensure societal healing.
• The TGoB requested a 17-month extension of the electoral calendar to finalise ceasefire agreements and army integration, but regional leaders instead granted a six-month extension in October 2004, setting the presidential election date for 22 April 2005.
• Political instability persisted during the transition, evidenced by the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) threatening to suspend participation in government and the national assembly in May 2004 over delays in implementing power-sharing appointments.

APA

Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). ISS Paper 97. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/97.PDF

Chicago

Institute for Security Studies. ISS Paper 97. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/97.PDF.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=ISS Paper 97 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/97.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesndiss, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{ISS Paper 97}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/97.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }