04-10-06 DPA.indd

This briefing by the Institute for Security Studies analyzes the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed on 5 May 2006. It argues that the conflict in Darfur is not merely a result of tribalism or ecological degradation, but is rooted in the broader struggle for power in Khartoum and a history of national marginalization. The document details the failures of the DPA to achieve broad legitimacy among rebel factions, the challenges facing the African Union Mission (AMIS), and the intricate links between the Darfur crisis and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan.

• The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), signed on 5 May 2006 between the Government of Sudan and the Minni Arkoi Minnawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), suffers from weak political commitment to its implementation and a lack of legitimacy among other rebel groups.
• The conflict in Darfur is framed as a challenge to the hegemony of Khartoum and a symptom of weak, unaccountable governance across Sudan, rather than just a tribal or ecological dispute.
• Historical marginalization in Darfur was exacerbated by the 1994 division of the region into three states (North, South, and West Darfur), which the document suggests was a 'divide and rule' strategy that split the Fur people and promoted Arabisation of state positions.
• The abolition of the 'native administration' system by President Jaffer Nimeiri in 1971 removed the traditional tribal mechanisms for conflict resolution and land allocation, contributing to the militarisation of groups during socio-ecological crises.
• The African Union Mission (AMIS), consisting of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police, has been hampered by under-resourcing and a perceived lack of neutrality, leading to fatalities among its troops and a loss of legitimacy among displaced populations.
• The DPA includes specific security, power-sharing, and wealth-sharing arrangements, such as the disarmament of Janjaweed militia by mid-October 2006, the creation of a $300 million initial reconstruction fund, and the establishment of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC).
• The National Redemption Front (NRF), formed in Asmara in June 2006 by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and dissident SLM factions, explicitly rejects the Abuja process and views the Darfur conflict as a national issue.
• The peace process in Darfur is inextricably linked to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the North and South; donor funding for the South has been partially tied to the resolution of the Darfur war.
• The Sudanese government has resisted the transition of AMIS to a United Nations mission, despite a UN Security Council resolution for a gradual handover, potentially using this rejection to extract concessions or avoid forceful disarmament under a Chapter VII mandate.

APA

Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). 04-10-06 DPA.indd. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/20060904DARFURSITREP.PDF

Chicago

Institute for Security Studies. 04-10-06 DPA.indd. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/20060904DARFURSITREP.PDF.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=04-10-06 DPA.indd |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/20060904DARFURSITREP.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesnd041006, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{04-10-06 DPA.indd}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/20060904DARFURSITREP.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }