Two Years On An Analysis of Russian State and Pro-Kremlin Information Warfare in the Context of the Invasion of Ukraine

The report analyzes how Russian propaganda has shifted from official state media to semi-covert tactics to bypass EU sanctions, while maintaining significant reach in the MENA region and Latin America. It identifies key vulnerabilities in the Western alliance—including economic stagnation in Germany, US isolationism, and the rise of far-right parties in the EU—that the Kremlin is likely to exploit. Additionally, it examines how Russia instrumentalizes the Israel-Hamas conflict to portray Western 'double standards' and promote a multipolar world order.

• While European Union sanctions against RT and Sputnik significantly reduced their reach in the EU—with web traffic from the EU dropping by 74% between 2021 and 2022—Russian state media maintains substantial engagement in other regions. In Latin America, 'RT en Español' reaches over 17 million people, and in the MENA region, the RT Arabic website recorded 57 million visits in the first quarter of 2024.
• To circumvent EU content blockages, pro-Kremlin actors employ several semi-covert tactics: using disguised spinoff outlets, coordinated account networks, fake personas, and the imitation of legitimate media. An example is 'Bloß mit Biss,' a TikTok and YouTube network that serves as a sub-outlet for Sputnik's German arm.
• The 'Doppelgänger' operation is a coordinated network that impersonates major news outlets to spread pro-Kremlin narratives. ISD identified 28 domains mimicking popular news outlets in Germany, France, Italy, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, as well as 29 Facebook ads promoting these sites.
• Since the second half of 2023, there has been an increase in the use of fake online personas—posing as 'whistleblowers', 'doctors', or 'journalists'—to plant unverified claims of corruption against Ukrainian officials, such as false stories about President Zelenskyy purchasing luxury villas or yachts.
• In Germany, Russian propaganda targets specific vulnerabilities to erode support for Ukraine, including economic stagnation, migration grievances, and pessimism regarding the war's outcome. This includes framing support for Ukraine as damaging to the local economy and spreading fabricated stories about Ukrainian refugees committing crimes or abusing welfare.
• The Kremlin views the potential rise of 'America First' isolationism in the US as a strategic opportunity to remove the most important source of military and economic support for Ukraine. High-profile interventions, such as Tucker Carlson's February 2024 interview with Vladimir Putin, are seen as efforts to influence the US right.
• Russian actors are likely to exploit the 2024 European Parliamentary elections to increase the influence of pro-Kremlin far-right parties. Such parties could potentially use veto power in the European Council to block support for Ukraine, similar to the actions of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán.
• Russia is instrumentalizing the Israel-Hamas conflict to accuse Western nations of 'double standards' and to portray the international order as broken. This narrative is particularly potent in the MENA region, where 51% of respondents view the US as the biggest threat to peace and stability.

APA

Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2024). Two Years On An Analysis of Russian State and Pro-Kremlin Information Warfare in the Context of the Invasion of Ukraine. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Two-Years-on_ISD.pdf

Chicago

Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Two Years On An Analysis of Russian State and Pro-Kremlin Information Warfare in the Context of the Invasion of Ukraine. 2024. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Two-Years-on_ISD.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Strategic Dialogue |title=Two Years On An Analysis of Russian State and Pro-Kremlin Information Warfare in the Context of the Invasion of Ukraine |date=2024 |url=https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Two-Years-on_ISD.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforstrategicdialogue2024two, author = {{Institute for Strategic Dialogue}}, title = {{Two Years On An Analysis of Russian State and Pro-Kremlin Information Warfare in the Context of the Invasion of Ukraine}}, institution = {Institute for Strategic Dialogue}, year = {2024}, url = {https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Two-Years-on_ISD.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }