THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL IN TACKLING CORRUPTION
Summary
The paper argues that while Namibia's Auditor-General produces professional audits, the lack of enforcement powers and a formalistic operational approach limit its impact on curbing corruption, particularly at regional and local government levels.
Key insights
- The Auditor-General (AG) of Namibia lacks formal enforcement powers to compel public sector institutions to implement audit recommendations, meaning the AG's duties are effectively complete once reports are submitted to the National Assembly via the Minister of Finance.
- Legislative inaction regarding audit reports in Namibia is attributed to ruling party loyalty among parliamentarians, a lack of technical understanding of audit jargon, and a shortage of parliamentary support staff.
- While central government ministries have shown improvement in audit opinions, regional and local authorities, as well as public enterprises, continue to perform poorly, with some receiving 'adverse' opinions indicating likely falsified accounts or mismanagement.
- A significant number of public enterprises (PEs) and statutory bodies fail to submit financial statements on time or at all, which severely hampers financial oversight; for example, 23 out of 38 such entities failed to do so in both 2014/15 and 2015/16.
- Expanding the AG's mandate to include enforcement is cautioned against because auditors must remain independent and objective; taking a management role in implementing recommendations would violate the principle that auditors should not audit their own work.
- The AG's office has not established its planned Specialised Investigation Unit for forensic audits due to resource constraints, meaning the assessment of fraud risk is currently limited to Regularity Audits for Local Authorities and PEs.
- The AG's role in the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 2016–2019 is limited, appearing in only two of six strategic objectives and largely consisting of duties already mandated by the State Finance Act 31 of 1991.
- International suggestions to improve the impact of Supreme Audit Institutions include forging closer links with anti-corruption agencies, improving communication with the media and civil society, and linking audit reports to government budget decision-making processes.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Remmert, D. (2020). THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL IN TACKLING CORRUPTION. Institute for Public Policy Research. https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Final-AG-Paper.pdf
- Chicago
- Remmert, Dietrich. THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL IN TACKLING CORRUPTION. Institute for Public Policy Research, 2020. https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Final-AG-Paper.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Remmert |first1=Dietrich |title=THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL IN TACKLING CORRUPTION |publisher=Institute for Public Policy Research |date=2020 |url=https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Final-AG-Paper.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ipprna-000132)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{remmert2020role, author = {Remmert, Dietrich}, title = {{THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL IN TACKLING CORRUPTION}}, institution = {Institute for Public Policy Research}, year = {2020}, url = {https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Final-AG-Paper.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ipprna-000132} }
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