AIDING, TRADING OR ABETTING? THE FUTURE OF TRADE, AID AND SECURITY

The document argues that current global trade rules are inequitable and often lock developing countries into a dependence on volatile primary commodities, which increases the risk of civil war. It highlights how rich-country agricultural subsidies and market access restrictions undermine economic diversification in the South. Regarding aid, the text warns that development assistance can inadvertently build the capacity of oppressive regimes or be diverted by the strategic interests of donor nations. The series also examines the 'resource curse,' where natural resource wealth leads to corruption and instability, and proposes a combination of mandatory legal regulations, transparency initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and conflict-sensitive business practices to break the link between resource extraction and violence.

• International trade rules are biased toward wealthy nations, utilizing tariff escalation and complex regulations to prevent developing countries from adding value to exports and diversifying their economies.
• Agricultural subsidies in the EU and U.S. depress global prices for products like cotton and rice, which costs developing countries an estimated US$72 billion annually—a sum equivalent to official aid flows in 2003.
• High dependence on primary commodity exports is statistically linked to a higher risk of civil war; for instance, if 25 per cent of revenue is derived from these exports, the risk of civil war jumps to over 30 per cent.
• Foreign aid has historically been used to build the capacity of oppressive governments, as seen in Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide, and is often driven by the strategic interests of donors rather than humanitarian need.
• The 'resource curse' describes a phenomenon where countries with abundant natural resources often suffer from higher corruption, worse governance, and lower Human Development Index rankings than those with diverse wealth.
• The ability of belligerents to access external markets is critical to the longevity of conflicts; closing borders to illegal exports, such as timber in Cambodia, can lead to the disintegration of insurgencies.
• Voluntary corporate social responsibility codes are often insufficient due to self-selection and lack of enforcement, necessitating more robust international legal frameworks to hold companies accountable for complicity in war crimes.
• Revenue management laws and trust funds can stabilize income and increase transparency, though their success often depends on the existing quality of a country's national budget management.

APA

International Institute for Sustainable Development (2006). AIDING, TRADING OR ABETTING? THE FUTURE OF TRADE, AID AND SECURITY. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/tas_objectives.pdf

Chicago

International Institute for Sustainable Development. AIDING, TRADING OR ABETTING? THE FUTURE OF TRADE, AID AND SECURITY. 2006. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/tas_objectives.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=International Institute for Sustainable Development |title=AIDING, TRADING OR ABETTING? THE FUTURE OF TRADE, AID AND SECURITY |date=2006 |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/tas_objectives.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{internationalinstituteforsustainabledevelopment2006aiding, author = {{International Institute for Sustainable Development}}, title = {{AIDING, TRADING OR ABETTING? THE FUTURE OF TRADE, AID AND SECURITY}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2006}, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/tas_objectives.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }