Consultation Paper – Electricity Network Regulation Review – Package 2

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IEEFA argues that the current Australian electricity network regulatory framework has failed, evidenced by $15 billion in supernormal profits from 2014-2023, and urges the AEMC to consider fundamental reforms including independent procurement of non-network solutions and a shift away from capex-biased incentives.

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  • Regulated electricity networks in Australia earned approximately $15 billion in supernormal profits between 2014 and 2023, in addition to $17.6 billion in allowed equity returns, with FY2022 profits reaching roughly 2.5 times the level required for risk compensation.
  • There is a structural bias toward capital expenditure (capex) over operational expenditure (opex) and non-network alternatives, with non-network alternatives accounting for only 0.15% of total network spending from 2013 to 2017.
  • The Regulated Asset Base (RAB) for distribution networks has increased by 34% per customer from 2006 to 2022, while absolute network utilisation has decreased by 15% over the same period.
  • The Demand Management Incentive Scheme (DMIS) has been largely ineffective, producing only $3.2 million in spending from an available pool of approximately $1 billion during the 2017•2022 network revenue period.
  • The current regulatory framework may be driving inefficient investments in legacy high-voltage alternating current (HVAC) and synchronous condenser technology over voltage source converter high voltage–direct current (VSC-HVDC) options, increasing the risk of future asset stranding.
  • Inflation rate variation (IRV) has been a primary driver of excess network returns from 2022 to 2024, leading to actual returns on regulated equity being significantly higher than allowed returns, particularly in 2023.

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APA
Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (2026). Consultation Paper – Electricity Network Regulation Review – Package 2. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2026-09/IEEFA%20submission_AEMC%20Electricity%20Network%20Regulation%20Review%20Package%202_0.pdf
Chicago
Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. Consultation Paper – Electricity Network Regulation Review – Package 2. 2026. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2026-09/IEEFA%20submission_AEMC%20Electricity%20Network%20Regulation%20Review%20Package%202_0.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite press release |author=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |title=Consultation Paper – Electricity Network Regulation Review – Package 2 |date=24 September 2026 |url=https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2026-09/IEEFA%20submission_AEMC%20Electricity%20Network%20Regulation%20Review%20Package%202_0.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-001458)}}
BibTeX
@misc{instituteforenergyeconomicsandfinancialanalysis2026consultation, author = {{Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}}, title = {{Consultation Paper – Electricity Network Regulation Review – Package 2}}, publisher = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, year = {2026}, month = sep, url = {https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2026-09/IEEFA%20submission_AEMC%20Electricity%20Network%20Regulation%20Review%20Package%202_0.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-001458} }

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