From Carbon Market to Climate Finance: The Use of ETS Revenues
Summary
The document argues that China can address its significant climate finance gap by earmarking ETS auctioning revenues for low-carbon and adaptation projects. It highlights the 'polluter-pays-principle' as a normative basis for this approach and analyzes the EU ETS, specifically Germany's Energy and Climate Fund (EKF), as a model for budgetary earmarking and transparency. The authors recommend that China maintain a stringent emissions cap, gradually increase auctioning rates, and combine the ETS with targeted energy efficiency investments to maximize mitigation potential.
Key insights
- China faces a substantial financial gap to meet its climate targets; by 2015, it is estimated to require annual investments of 1963.2 bn RMB, with an expected gap of 1221.9 bn RMB (approximately 198bn USD).
- The use of 'earmarking' for ETS revenues—either through direct budgetary allocation or political earmarking of equivalent values—ensures minimum financing for environmental purposes, increases transparency, and can improve public acceptance of the instrument.
- In China, potential revenues from a moderate auctioning rate (10%) and a price of 30 RMB/ton on an estimated 800 million to 1 billion metric tonnes of emissions could generate between 2400 million and 3000 million RMB (398-486 million USD) for climate action.
- Germany provides a case study of 'full budgetary earmarking' through its Energy and Climate Fund (EKF), which channels EU ETS revenues into national climate actions (such as renewable energy and building energy efficiency) and international climate finance.
- Analysis of the EU ETS suggests that the highest energy savings occur when a tightened emissions cap is combined with an energy efficiency obligation and the reinvestment of ETS revenues into energy efficiency measures.
- The authors recommend that China avoid the 'over-allocation of emissions allowances' seen in the early EU ETS by keeping the cap stringent (stricter than business-as-usual) and gradually increasing the auctioning rate to prevent 'windfall profits' for industry.
- To manage the risk of fluctuating carbon prices, the paper suggests China establish a mechanism where the annual budget for climate funds is set ex-ante, with gaps filled by the national general budget.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Germanwatch (2013). From Carbon Market to Climate Finance: The Use of ETS Revenues. https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/publication/8337.pdf
- Chicago
- Germanwatch. From Carbon Market to Climate Finance: The Use of ETS Revenues. 2013. https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/publication/8337.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |author=Germanwatch |title=From Carbon Market to Climate Finance: The Use of ETS Revenues |date=September 2013 |url=https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/publication/8337.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document gerwat-001302)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{germanwatch2013from, author = {{Germanwatch}}, title = {{From Carbon Market to Climate Finance: The Use of ETS Revenues}}, institution = {Germanwatch}, year = {2013}, month = sep, url = {https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/publication/8337.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document gerwat-001302} }
Full text
Collected · Record updated