Supporting Follow-up Screening for Flagged Nucleic Acid Synthesis Orders

The policy brief identifies critical gaps in how commercial DNA and RNA synthesis providers conduct follow-up screening when orders are flagged for sequences of concern. It highlights a lack of specialized software tools, the absence of verifiable standards for customer legitimacy, and poor information-sharing infrastructure between providers and law enforcement. To mitigate biosecurity risks, the authors propose that the US government support third-party 'Know Your Customer' (KYC) services, develop decision-support software, standardize data formats for flagged orders, mandate secure information sharing, and require a second institutional approver for high-risk orders.

• The current follow-up screening process for nucleic acid synthesis is largely ad-hoc, with staff often lacking specialized tools and relying on manual methods like searching LinkedIn to verify customer affiliations.
• Follow-up screening is the most resource-intensive part of the process, typically requiring a PhD in bioinformatics; approximately 5% of orders are flagged, with 'red' flag hits taking several hours to resolve.
• There is no global consensus or verifiable standard for what constitutes a 'legitimate customer,' which creates ambiguity when evaluating non-traditional laboratory spaces or customers without a specific research history.
• Existing information-sharing mechanisms, such as those within the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC), are rarely used, leaving providers unable to detect 'venue shopping' or 'order splitting' where actors distribute a dangerous sequence across multiple providers.
• The authors recommend the US government support the creation of third-party Know Your Customer (KYC) services to authenticate end users and verify identification across different languages and countries.
• To reduce the burden on providers, the document proposes a tiered flagging system (red, yellow, and gray) and the development of software tools that provide context on customer profiles and order history.
• The brief suggests standardizing data formats for flagged orders to improve screening algorithms and enable a secure, encrypted repository for sharing data with other providers and the FBI's weapons of mass destruction coordinators.
• For high-risk 'red-flagged' orders, the authors recommend requiring a second approver from the customer's institution, such as a biosafety officer, to mitigate insider threats and accidental exposure.

APA

The Council on Strategic Risks (2024). Supporting Follow-up Screening for Flagged Nucleic Acid Synthesis Orders. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/05/07/supporting-follow-up-screening-for-flagged-nucleic-acid-synthesis-orders/

Chicago

The Council on Strategic Risks. Supporting Follow-up Screening for Flagged Nucleic Acid Synthesis Orders. 2024. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/05/07/supporting-follow-up-screening-for-flagged-nucleic-acid-synthesis-orders/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=The Council on Strategic Risks |title=Supporting Follow-up Screening for Flagged Nucleic Acid Synthesis Orders |date=7 May 2024 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/05/07/supporting-follow-up-screening-for-flagged-nucleic-acid-synthesis-orders/ |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{thecouncilonstrategicrisks2024supporting, author = {{The Council on Strategic Risks}}, title = {{Supporting Follow-up Screening for Flagged Nucleic Acid Synthesis Orders}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2024}, month = may, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/05/07/supporting-follow-up-screening-for-flagged-nucleic-acid-synthesis-orders/}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }