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The document analyzes the Brazilian Forest Code through the lens of property rights theory, arguing that the gap between formal laws (de jure) and actual practice (de facto) creates uncertainty that hinders environmental protection. It traces the historical path dependence of Brazilian land ownership, which resulted in extreme concentration of wealth and power. The author links insecure property rights to several 'pathologies,' including land conflicts, the absence of tenancy markets, and increased deforestation in the Amazon. The paper concludes that for the Forest Code to succeed, the government must provide credible signals to converge de facto and de jure rights and reduce transaction costs for compliance.

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  • The Brazilian Forest Code is described as one of the most restrictive land laws globally, requiring landowners to preserve native vegetation on 20% of their total property area, increasing to 80% in the Amazon.
  • A critical challenge for the Forest Code is the insecurity arising from the wedge between de jure property rights (formal laws) and de facto property rights (actual practice), which can lead to opportunistic and unproductive behavior.
  • Brazil's land ownership is characterized by extreme concentration, a result of historical path dependence starting from the colonial era, which contrasts with the more equalitarian development of the United States.
  • Insecure property rights in Brazil have led to significant 'pathologies,' including a surge in land conflicts and violence, particularly driven by the 'social function of property' requirement that land maintain satisfactory productivity levels.
  • Brazil has remarkably low use of tenancy contracts compared to other countries; in 1995, less than 5% of agricultural land was under tenancy, partly because landowners avoid these contracts to prevent future property challenges.
  • Deforestation in the Amazon is linked to insecure property rights, as clearing forest can serve as evidence of 'productive use' to protect land from expropriation for land reform.
  • Insecure property rights distort agricultural investment and crop choices; for example, a one-standard deviation increase in conflicts reduced the area of natural pasture by 17% and unused land by 3.7%.
  • Agricultural production in Brazil is highly skewed; as of 2006, less than 1% of farms generated more than half of the gross income, while 66% of farms produced only 3.27% of the income.
  • The failure of previous land reform programs to create productive family farms suggests that the Forest Code may suffer from similar perverse incentives if the government focuses on single metrics (like the number of compliant farms) rather than long-term environmental goals.
  • To ensure the success of the Forest Code, the author recommends establishing clear property rights through consistent implementation and reducing transaction costs, such as allowing the purchase of compensating legal reserves on less productive land.

Cite the original document

APA
Assunção, J., Gandour, C., & Rocha, R. (2013). Como DETER o Desmatamento na Amazônia? Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Literature_Review_Property_Rights_and_Forest_Code.pdf
Chicago
Assunção, Juliano, Clarissa Gandour, and Romero Rocha. Como DETER o Desmatamento na Amazônia? Climate Policy Initiative, 2013. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Literature_Review_Property_Rights_and_Forest_Code.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Assunção |first1=Juliano |last2=Gandour |first2=Clarissa |last3=Rocha |first3=Romero |title=Como DETER o Desmatamento na Amazônia? |publisher=Climate Policy Initiative |date=May 2013 |url=https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Literature_Review_Property_Rights_and_Forest_Code.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{assuno2013como, author = {Assunção, Juliano and Gandour, Clarissa and Rocha, Romero}, title = {{Como DETER o Desmatamento na Amazônia?}}, institution = {Climate Policy Initiative}, year = {2013}, month = may, url = {https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Literature_Review_Property_Rights_and_Forest_Code.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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