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The paper examines Southeast Asia's role as a critical node in global subsea cable networks, highlighting vulnerabilities to seismic activity, climate-driven weather events, and human activity. It analyzes how U.S.-China geopolitical competition is 'securitizing' digital infrastructure, leading to rerouted cables and pressure on regional governments to exclude Chinese suppliers. Additionally, it discusses the rising influence of 'hyperscalers' (Big Tech firms) who are vertically integrating cable ownership to control the data value chain.

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  • Southeast Asia is a vital global connectivity hub, with Singapore serving as a primary node; Singapore hosted twenty-six cable landings in 2023 and expects to be connected to over forty subsea cables by 2028.
  • Cables in the region face significant natural and human-induced risks, including seismic activity in the 'Ring of Fire', anchor drags in busy shipping lanes like the Strait of Malacca, and climate-driven threats such as typhoons and rising sea levels.
  • Vietnam has experienced severe connectivity crises due to a lack of cable redundancy; in February 2023, damage to all five of its international cables caused a 75 percent loss of data flow.
  • Administrative hurdles and protectionist policies, such as Indonesia's cabotage policy, can significantly delay critical cable repairs, extending timelines from days to several weeks.
  • U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry is driving the 'securitization' of cable infrastructure, resulting in the rerouting of cables (such as Apricot and Echo) to avoid the South China Sea and U.S. efforts to dissuade Southeast Asian nations from using Chinese contractors like HMN Tech.
  • The U.S. government utilizes 'national security agreements' to control cable operations, as seen with the Pacific Light Cable Network (PLCN), requiring risk assessments and the diversification of interconnection points.
  • Large technology firms, or 'hyperscalers' (including Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon), are shifting from purchasing capacity to owning the cables themselves to control the entire internet services value chain.

Cite the original document

APA
Noor, E. (2024). Southeast Asia Undersea Subsea Cables. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/12/southeast-asia-undersea-subsea-cables
Chicago
Noor, Elina. Southeast Asia Undersea Subsea Cables. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/12/southeast-asia-undersea-subsea-cables.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Noor |first1=Elina |title=Southeast Asia Undersea Subsea Cables |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=18 December 2024 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/12/southeast-asia-undersea-subsea-cables |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-002335)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{noor2024southeast, author = {Noor, Elina}, title = {{Southeast Asia Undersea Subsea Cables}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2024}, month = dec, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/12/southeast-asia-undersea-subsea-cables}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-002335} }

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