BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants

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The document provides a comprehensive analysis of how various nations view BRICS as a tool for geopolitical influence, economic diversification, and a counterweight to U.S. hegemony. While Russia and China seek to institutionalize a 'post-American' order through de-dollarization and alternative financial systems, other members like Brazil and India pursue 'multi-alignment' to maintain ties with the West while increasing their status in the Global South. New members and aspirants, including Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, are primarily driven by the need for infrastructure investment, development finance via the New Development Bank (NDB), and strategic autonomy in the face of intensifying U.S.-China competition and the return of the Trump administration.

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  • Brazil views BRICS membership as a source of prestige and a 'mutual diplomatic support group' that provides a 'safe haven' during periods of isolation from the West, such as during the Bolsonaro administration.
  • Russia perceives BRICS as a foundation for a 'Pax Post-Americana' and seeks to use the bloc as a 'sandbox' to develop trade and finance tools, including payment systems alternative to SWIFT, to evade Western sanctions.
  • India utilizes BRICS to display international leadership and claim leadership of the Global South, while simultaneously attempting to prevent the group from becoming a 'virulently anti-Western clique' or falling under complete Chinese domination.
  • China views BRICS as a 'strategic bridge' to coordinate non-Western positions and reform the international order, leveraging the bloc to hedge against Western decoupling and promote the internationalization of the renminbi.
  • South Africa uses BRICS to amplify its global influence and advocate for reforms in the UN Security Council, IMF, and World Bank, while positioning itself as a 'gateway to Africa' for BRICS investment.
  • Egypt's primary motivations for joining BRICS include securing development aid, expanding trade in national currencies to mitigate U.S. dollar shortages, and diversifying its strategic partnerships away from unilateral reliance on the West.
  • Ethiopia views BRICS as a vehicle to advance infrastructure investment and climate resilience, specifically seeking NDB financing to avoid the conditionalities typically imposed by Bretton Woods institutions.
  • Indonesia joined BRICS in January 2025 as a means of 'strategic diversification,' aiming to bridge interests between developed and developing states while maintaining its 'free/independent and active' foreign policy.
  • Iran views BRICS as a geopolitical and economic counterweight to U.S. hegemony, specifically aiming to 'eliminate the dollar in trade' and expand its exports of military hardware.
  • The UAE views BRICS membership as a pragmatic tool for economic diversification and 'strategic autonomy,' explicitly stating that the bloc is not intended as a counterweight to the United States.
  • Nigeria, as a partner country, seeks to leverage BRICS to regain its status as a leading African economy and to support the de-dollarization of the global oil market.
  • Aspirants such as Venezuela and Senegal see BRICS as a way to reduce dependence on former colonial powers or the U.S., while others like Colombia and Vietnam remain cautious to avoid jeopardizing critical security and trade ties with Washington.

Cite the original document

APA
Stuenkel, O., & Gabuev, A. (2025). BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants
Chicago
Stuenkel, Oliver, and Alexander Gabuev. BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Stuenkel |first1=Oliver |last2=Gabuev |first2=Alexander |title=BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=31 March 2025 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001018)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{stuenkel2025brics, author = {Stuenkel, Oliver and Gabuev, Alexander}, title = {{BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2025}, month = mar, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001018} }

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