BRICS Summit: Emerging Middle Powers, G7, and G20
Summary
The expansion of BRICS into BRICS+ reflects a global desire to challenge the structural advantages of Western-led international orders. While the bloc possesses significant economic leverage—representing 40% of global trade and crude oil production—its internal heterogeneity and geopolitical rivalries, particularly between China and India, limit its ability to form a unified anti-Western bloc. The author argues that BRICS+ is more likely to act as a platform for incremental 'bricolage' with multilateral rules rather than a rigid Cold War-style alliance. For the G20, the risk of fragmentation into G7 and BRICS+ factions is mitigated by the desire of middle powers like Brazil and India to maintain diplomatic flexibility. The document concludes that the West should respond by addressing the legitimate grievances of emerging powers to prevent them from fully aligning with China and Russia.
Key insights
- BRICS+ is a significant economic entity, accounting for 40% of global trade, 40% of crude oil production and exports, and half of the world's population.
- The primary objective of BRICS+ is to challenge the structural advantages and 'exorbitant privileges' enjoyed by advanced market democracies within a global order created by and for the West.
- Efforts by BRICS to create substantive alternatives to Western financial systems have seen mixed results; the New Development Bank (NDB) remains undercapitalized, and attempts to create a global reserve currency face 'serious headwinds' due to the dollar's dominance and restrictions on the Chinese renminbi.
- Internal contradictions—including differences in regime type (democracies vs. authoritarian powers), economic disparities, and fierce geopolitical rivalries between China and India—hinder the bloc's coherence and its ability to pursue a unified policy agenda.
- China exerts disproportionate influence within the group, accounting for nearly 70% of the coalition's total GDP and occasionally overriding the consensus-based decision-making process, as seen during the expansion to include Iran.
- The expansion of BRICS+ is unlikely to result in rigid, competing blocs within the G20 because key middle powers (Brazil, India, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia) prefer 'multialignment' and wish to retain diplomatic flexibility.
- The claim that BRICS+ represents the 'Global Majority' is questioned because the bloc includes major powers and wealthy oil exporters whose interests may conflict with the needs of the poorest nations in the Global South, particularly regarding the clean energy transition.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Patrick, S. (2024). BRICS Summit: Emerging Middle Powers, G7, and G20. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/brics-summit-emerging-middle-powers-g7-g20
- Chicago
- Patrick, Stewart. BRICS Summit: Emerging Middle Powers, G7, and G20. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/brics-summit-emerging-middle-powers-g7-g20.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Patrick |first1=Stewart |title=BRICS Summit: Emerging Middle Powers, G7, and G20 |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=9 October 2024 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/brics-summit-emerging-middle-powers-g7-g20 |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000184)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{patrick2024brics, author = {Patrick, Stewart}, title = {{BRICS Summit: Emerging Middle Powers, G7, and G20}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2024}, month = oct, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/brics-summit-emerging-middle-powers-g7-g20}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000184} }
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