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The report finds that public climate finance is woefully inadequate, with an estimated US$95.3bn in 2022 falling far short of the US$1-1.5 trillion annual need. It highlights a systemic reliance on loans over grants, with two-thirds of public finance consisting of loans, often on non-concessional terms, which exacerbates debt in vulnerable nations. Adaptation and loss and damage are severely underfunded, with the latter receiving approximately 1% of bilateral finance. The authors argue that official reporting overstates the real fiscal effort, estimating the actual value of 2022 funds at only US$28-35bn compared to the reported US$116bn. Additionally, the report notes that climate finance often diverts funds from core official development assistance (ODA) and fails to prioritize gender equality or local leadership.

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  • Public climate finance is insufficient to meet developing countries' needs and is projected to decline. While the OECD reported nearly US$116bn for 2022, the authors estimate public climate finance at US$95.3bn, against annual needs of US$1-1.5 trillion in public, grant-equivalent finance. Planned ODA cuts could reduce this to US$72-79bn by 2025.
  • A majority of public climate finance is provided as loans, which increases the debt burden of recipient countries. Over 2021–22, two-thirds of public climate finance were loans, mostly non-concessional. France, Japan, Italy, Spain, and Germany had the highest shares of loans. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) provided 79% of their finance as loans, with only 12% as grants.
  • Adaptation finance is consistently underfunded and fails to achieve balance with mitigation. Adaptation received approximately one-third of public climate finance over 2021–22. The goal to double adaptation finance by 2025 is at risk due to ODA cuts, with projections suggesting it could drop to US$26bn–29bn in 2024–25.
  • Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) receive a small share of total finance, much of it as loans. On average over 2021–22, LDCs received 19.5% (US$16.5bn) and SIDS received 2.9% (US$2.1bn) of public climate finance. Over half of the finance to these groups (52% for LDCs and 57% for SIDS) was provided via non-grant instruments.
  • Official reporting significantly overstates the actual financial effort of developed countries. While developed countries reported nearly US$116bn for 2022, the authors' Climate-Specific Net Assistance (CSNA) estimate places the real value at US$28–35bn. This discrepancy is attributed to counting loans at face value and exaggerating climate relevance.
  • Finance for loss and damage is almost entirely neglected. The authors estimate that only about 1% of total bilateral climate finance in 2022 (US$0.5bn) may have been dedicated to loss and damage interventions, partly due to a lack of separate reporting requirements.
  • Climate finance is often not 'new and additional' but is instead diverted from existing ODA budgets. Climate-specific ODA accounts for about one-quarter of ODA budgets, which the report argues undermines other development priorities like health and education.
  • Gender equality and local leadership are largely ignored in climate finance allocation. Only an estimated 3% of bilateral climate finance in 2022 had gender equality as a main objective. Additionally, there is a lack of data on how much finance is spent at the local level or in partnership with local communities.
  • Data on mobilized private finance is inconsistent and lacks transparency. Figures reported by developed countries in their First Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) are significantly higher than those reported by the OECD; for 2022, BTRs reported US$18bn in bilaterally mobilized finance compared to the OECD's US$9.2bn.

Cite the original document

APA
Kowalzig, J., Nordbo, J., Sørensen, R. B., Cherry-Virdee, T., Dejgaard, H. P., & Dabi, N. (2025). CLIMATE FINANCE SHADOW REPORT 2025. CARE Climate Justice Center. https://careclimatechange.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/CLEAN_Climate_Finance_Shadow-Report_2025_Oxfam_CARE.pdf
Chicago
Kowalzig, Jan, John Nordbo, Rasmus Bo Sørensen, Tallulah Cherry-Virdee, Hans Peter Dejgaard, and Nafkote Dabi. CLIMATE FINANCE SHADOW REPORT 2025. CARE Climate Justice Center, 2025. https://careclimatechange.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/CLEAN_Climate_Finance_Shadow-Report_2025_Oxfam_CARE.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Kowalzig |first1=Jan |last2=Nordbo |first2=John |last3=Sørensen |first3=Rasmus Bo |last4=Cherry-Virdee |first4=Tallulah |last5=Dejgaard |first5=Hans Peter |last6=Dabi |first6=Nafkote |title=CLIMATE FINANCE SHADOW REPORT 2025 |publisher=CARE Climate Justice Center |date=October 2025 |url=https://careclimatechange.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/CLEAN_Climate_Finance_Shadow-Report_2025_Oxfam_CARE.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carecli-000246)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{kowalzig2025climate, author = {Kowalzig, Jan and Nordbo, John and Sørensen, Rasmus Bo and Cherry-Virdee, Tallulah and Dejgaard, Hans Peter and Dabi, Nafkote}, title = {{CLIMATE FINANCE SHADOW REPORT 2025}}, institution = {CARE Climate Justice Center}, year = {2025}, month = oct, url = {https://careclimatechange.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/CLEAN_Climate_Finance_Shadow-Report_2025_Oxfam_CARE.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carecli-000246} }

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