Zimbabwe on the Brink: Will 2018 Elections Bring Crisis End or Make it Worse

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The document analyzes the 2018 Zimbabwean elections following the November 2017 coup, highlighting the consolidation of military power within the state and the lack of credible democratic reforms by the 'new dispensation'. It identifies significant risks of electoral irregularities, low public trust in the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, and the potential for post-election violence, while noting the critical role of the youth vote and the influence of 'reticent' voters in determining the outcome.

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  • The November 2017 military intervention, termed 'Operation Restore Legacy' by the government, is described as a coup that consolidated the military's partisan role within the state and Zanu-PF.
  • The 'new dispensation' government has failed to implement credible reforms to ensure a non-partisan state, as evidenced by its refusal to enforce High Court rulings against the partisan activities of traditional leaders and the forced attendance of school children at political rallies.
  • Public trust in the electoral process is low, with Afrobarometer data showing that 41% of citizens doubt the military will accept the results and 40% expect post-election violence.
  • The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is characterized by a lack of transparency and accountability, contributing to a 'rancorous atmosphere' and mistrust among opposition parties and civil society.
  • Demographic shifts indicate the youth vote will be decisive, with a 77% increase in urban youth registration and nearly 65% of all registered voters being under 45 years old.
  • While Zanu-PF held a 12% lead over the MDC Alliance in opinion polls, a substantial group of 'reticent' or 'undecided' voters (estimated between 1.4 million and 1.6 million) could significantly alter the final result.
  • Despite constitutional requirements for a 50/50 gender split, women are underrepresented as candidates; only 13% (204 out of 1,592) of candidates are women.

Cite the original document

APA
Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southern Africa (2018). Zimbabwe on the Brink: Will 2018 Elections Bring Crisis End or Make it Worse. https://za.boell.org/en/2018/07/25/zimbabwe-brink-will-2018-elections-bring-crisis-end-or-make-it-worse
Chicago
Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southern Africa. Zimbabwe on the Brink: Will 2018 Elections Bring Crisis End or Make it Worse. 2018. https://za.boell.org/en/2018/07/25/zimbabwe-brink-will-2018-elections-bring-crisis-end-or-make-it-worse.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southern Africa |title=Zimbabwe on the Brink: Will 2018 Elections Bring Crisis End or Make it Worse |date=25 July 2018 |url=https://za.boell.org/en/2018/07/25/zimbabwe-brink-will-2018-elections-bring-crisis-end-or-make-it-worse |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document boellza-000084)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{heinrichbllstiftungsouthernafrica2018zimbabwe, author = {{Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southern Africa}}, title = {{Zimbabwe on the Brink: Will 2018 Elections Bring Crisis End or Make it Worse}}, institution = {Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southern Africa}, year = {2018}, month = jul, url = {https://za.boell.org/en/2018/07/25/zimbabwe-brink-will-2018-elections-bring-crisis-end-or-make-it-worse}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document boellza-000084} }

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