Does the African middle class defend democracy? Evidence from Kenya

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Using Afrobarometer survey data from 2011, the paper finds that wealthier and more educated Kenyans are more likely to support democratic rule and the political opposition. While ethnicity remains the primary driver of party support, class is a significant secondary factor. However, qualitative evidence from the 2013 elections suggests that ethnic loyalty can override class-based democratic inclinations during national polls.

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  • Analysis of Afrobarometer data indicates that the Kenyan middle class is more likely to hold pro-democratic attitudes and support political opposition parties.
  • Wealth and education are statistically significant predictors of a citizen's likelihood to reject the party of the president (PNU), whereas employment status and lived poverty are not.
  • Ethnicity remains the dominant factor in determining partisan identity in Kenya, with specific groups like the Kikuyu strongly supporting the president's party, while the Luo, Luhya, Kamba, and Kalenjin tend to support the opposition.
  • Class is a more significant predictor of support for democracy than ethnicity, with the exception of Somali voters who are notably more pro-democracy.
  • Higher levels of education correlate with a broader commitment to pluralism, including stronger support for multiparty politics and a lower likelihood of believing the president should act without legal constraints.
  • Older Kenyans are more likely to support democracy than younger Kenyans, potentially because they remember the constraints of the previous one-party state.
  • The author argues that the common US$2-a-day threshold for defining the middle class is too low, as the 'class effect' on democratic attitudes only appears at higher levels of wealth and education.
  • Qualitative evidence from the 2013 general election suggests that ethnic pressures and a 'siege mentality' created by the Jubilee Alliance can force middle-class citizens to abandon their democratic preferences in favor of ethnic loyalty.

Cite the original document

APA
Cheeseman, N. (2014). Does the African middle class defend democracy? Evidence from Kenya. Afrobarometer. https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Afropaperno150.pdf
Chicago
Cheeseman, Nic. Does the African middle class defend democracy? Evidence from Kenya. Afrobarometer, 2014. https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Afropaperno150.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Cheeseman |first1=Nic |title=Does the African middle class defend democracy? Evidence from Kenya |publisher=Afrobarometer |date=December 2014 |url=https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Afropaperno150.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document afbarom-000511)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{cheeseman2014does, author = {Cheeseman, Nic}, title = {{Does the African middle class defend democracy? Evidence from Kenya}}, institution = {Afrobarometer}, year = {2014}, month = dec, url = {https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Afropaperno150.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document afbarom-000511} }

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