Instruments de mesure, d’analyse et de suivi de la gouvernance

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The document examines the use of household surveys, specifically the 1-2-3 surveys and Afrobarometer, to track governance and petty bureaucratic corruption. Focusing on Madagascar and seven other African capitals, it finds that vulnerability to corruption often correlates with lower education and income in Antananarivo, while the acceptance of corruption is driven more by 'habituation' and perceived prevalence than by cultural values. Long-term data from Madagascar (1995-2004) suggests a strong negative correlation between civil servant salaries and corruption levels, and shows that institutional instability, such as the 2001-2002 crisis, leads to a rapid increase in corrupt practices.

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  • In Madagascar, a vast majority of the population identifies poor governance as the primary driver of the country's lack of development, viewing it as a structural rather than temporary issue.
  • Analysis of eight African capitals shows that having a member of the household employed in the civil service generally reduces the risk of being a victim of corruption, likely due to better knowledge of administrative circuits or professional solidarity.
  • In Antananarivo, the poorest and least educated individuals are more vulnerable to corruption, whereas in cities like Ouagadougou and Niamey, corruption incidence increases with income, suggesting officials target victims based on their ability to pay.
  • The document rejects the 'culturalist' thesis that corruption in Africa is a natural social practice; instead, it argues that tolerance for corruption in Madagascar stems from an 'accustomization' effect caused by the perception that such practices are generalized.
  • Individuals are more likely to resort to offering bribes if they have previously been victims of corruption, indicating a vicious cycle where personal experience lowers the threshold for engaging in corrupt acts.
  • Longitudinal data from Antananarivo (1995-2004) reveals that petty corruption decreased significantly from 42% to 10% between 1995 and 2001, correlating with a real-term increase in civil servant salaries of over 60%.
  • Institutional instability in Madagascar during the 2001-2002 crisis caused the incidence of petty corruption to double within one year, though it fell again to 8% by 2004 following stabilization and the introduction of anti-corruption bodies like BIANCO.

Cite the original document

APA
Razafindrakoto, M., & Roubaud, F. (2006). Instruments de mesure, d’analyse et de suivi de la gouvernance. Afrobarometer. https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/AfrobriefNo39.pdf
Chicago
Razafindrakoto, Mireille, and Francois Roubaud. Instruments de mesure, d’analyse et de suivi de la gouvernance. Afrobarometer, 2006. https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/AfrobriefNo39.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Razafindrakoto |first1=Mireille |last2=Roubaud |first2=Francois |title=Instruments de mesure, d’analyse et de suivi de la gouvernance |publisher=Afrobarometer |date=June 2006 |url=https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/AfrobriefNo39.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document afbarom-000458)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{razafindrakoto2006instruments, author = {Razafindrakoto, Mireille and Roubaud, Francois}, title = {{Instruments de mesure, d’analyse et de suivi de la gouvernance}}, institution = {Afrobarometer}, year = {2006}, month = jun, url = {https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/AfrobriefNo39.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document afbarom-000458} }

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