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This briefing argues that Ghana's proposed fiscal rule, which targets a deficit of 3 to 5 percent of GDP, is insufficient on its own and should be supplemented with structural balance rules and expenditure caps to prevent pro-cyclical spending and off-budget borrowing.

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  • Ghana's fiscal sustainability has been undermined by rapid growth in spending and borrowing, with interest payments equaling 29 percent of domestic revenues by 2016 and public debt peaking at over 70 percent of GDP.
  • Expectations of oil wealth likely contributed to a debt crisis, as the government issued five Eurobonds totaling USD 4.5 billion shortly after oil discovery, often citing oil as a reason for optimism in investor presentations.
  • The proposed fiscal rule targeting a deficit as a percentage of GDP is pro-cyclical, meaning it may exacerbate boom-bust cycles by allowing spending to increase during economic growth and forcing cuts during slowdowns.
  • Capping the fiscal deficit alone is insufficient because it does not prevent off-budget borrowing by state-owned companies or the accumulation of arrears, such as the GHS 7 billion in total arrears reported by the end of 2016.
  • Ghana's public investment efficiency is relatively low, with IMF 2012 scores of 1.33 for both project appraisal and evaluation, indicating inherent weaknesses in how the country manages capital projects.
  • To improve effectiveness, the document recommends a 4 percent structural deficit target to avoid pro-cyclicality and an additional rule capping the growth rate of recurrent expenditures to ensure windfalls are used for investment.
  • Effective oversight of fiscal rules requires an independent body, such as a fiscal council or the recently established Scrutiny Office, to conduct independent analysis and evaluate the legitimacy of invoking escape clauses.

Cite the original document

APA
Adam, A., & Mihalyi, D. (2017). Optimizing Ghana’s Fiscal Rule. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/optimize-ghana-fisal-rule.pdf
Chicago
Adam, Aisha, and David Mihalyi. Optimizing Ghana’s Fiscal Rule. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2017. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/optimize-ghana-fisal-rule.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Adam |first1=Aisha |last2=Mihalyi |first2=David |title=Optimizing Ghana’s Fiscal Rule |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=October 2017 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/optimize-ghana-fisal-rule.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000704)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{adam2017optimizing, author = {Adam, Aisha and Mihalyi, David}, title = {{Optimizing Ghana’s Fiscal Rule}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2017}, month = oct, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/optimize-ghana-fisal-rule.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000704} }

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