ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА РЕЖИМА НАЛОГООБЛОЖЕНИЯ ЗОЛОТОДОБЫВАЮЩЕЙ ОТРАСЛИ В КЫРГЫЗСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКЕ

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The report finds that the gold mining tax regime in the Kyrgyz Republic is significantly lighter than in comparable countries, but that high political and regulatory risks are greater deterrents to investment than the tax structure itself.

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  • The current tax burden on gold mining companies in the Kyrgyz Republic (excluding Kumtor) is significantly lower than in other similar countries, with the state's share of profits for a hypothetical enterprise being less than the 40-60% range considered 'reasonably achievable' by the IMF.
  • Non-tax factors, specifically high political risks, corruption, and poor infrastructure, are the primary obstacles to mining investment in the Kyrgyz Republic, and low tax rates cannot fully compensate for these concerns.
  • The gold mining sector is a critical revenue source, but it is dominated by the Kumtor mine, which accounts for 90% of all industry budget contributions; however, production at Kumtor is projected to cease by 2026 without new investment.
  • The existing tax regime is relatively regressive regarding production costs, meaning high-cost enterprises face a higher relative tax burden than low-cost enterprises, which may deter investment in marginal projects.
  • Among the evaluated reform options, Option V (introducing a 10% corporate income tax while maintaining the current income tax) is identified as the most practical balance between increasing revenue and maintaining investment attractiveness.
  • Option G (replacing the income tax with corporate income tax and an operational profit tax) is the most progressive regarding production costs and gold prices, but it is more difficult for the tax service to administer.
  • Option D, based on the South African model of a variable profit tax, is the least suitable for the Kyrgyz Republic due to a high risk of tax abuse and low progressivity compared to the current regime.

Cite the original document

APA
Мэнли, Д. (2018). ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА РЕЖИМА НАЛОГООБЛОЖЕНИЯ ЗОЛОТОДОБЫВАЮЩЕЙ ОТРАСЛИ В КЫРГЫЗСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКЕ. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/gold-mining-tax-regimes-in-the-kyrgyz-republic_.pdf
Chicago
Мэнли, Дэвид. ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА РЕЖИМА НАЛОГООБЛОЖЕНИЯ ЗОЛОТОДОБЫВАЮЩЕЙ ОТРАСЛИ В КЫРГЫЗСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКЕ. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2018. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/gold-mining-tax-regimes-in-the-kyrgyz-republic_.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Мэнли |first1=Дэвид |title=ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА РЕЖИМА НАЛОГООБЛОЖЕНИЯ ЗОЛОТОДОБЫВАЮЩЕЙ ОТРАСЛИ В КЫРГЫЗСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКЕ |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=June 2018 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/gold-mining-tax-regimes-in-the-kyrgyz-republic_.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000415)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{2018, author = {Мэнли, Дэвид}, title = {{ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА РЕЖИМА НАЛОГООБЛОЖЕНИЯ ЗОЛОТОДОБЫВАЮЩЕЙ ОТРАСЛИ В КЫРГЫЗСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКЕ}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2018}, month = jun, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/gold-mining-tax-regimes-in-the-kyrgyz-republic_.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000415} }

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