Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar
Summary
The report argues that while decentralizing natural resource governance can address historical grievances and improve local oversight, it risks increasing corruption and undermining investment if not accompanied by clear role definitions and capacity building.
Key insights
- In Myanmar, licensing for the extractive industries is primarily based on national legislation and implemented by national institutions, although subnational stakeholders often exercise significant de facto influence, particularly in the mining sector where some chief ministers can effectively veto decisions.
- The lack of a unified digital cadaster in Myanmar complicates land management, as ownership information is often stored in paper form at the township level and distributed across different ministries, leading to widespread allegations of land grabs.
- Myanmar's fiscal framework is centrally determined, with the Union government and state-owned enterprises collecting almost all revenues, though some minor mineral taxes from gravel and sand are collected by state and regional governments.
- Environmental management in Myanmar is centrally controlled by the Environmental Conservation Department (ECD), but implementation is weak and monitoring capacity is limited, despite plans to increase staff at the state and regional levels.
- Occupational safety and health (OSH) responsibilities in Myanmar are fragmented across various Union institutions and state-owned enterprises, with a lack of clear definition and minimal inspections conducted by the Ministry of Labour in the extractive sector.
- Local content requirements in Myanmar are limited and primarily focused on hiring citizens generally, with no formal legal provisions specifically targeting subnational stakeholders or affected communities.
- While Myanmar is shifting some licensing and revenue collection for artisanal and small-scale extraction to subnational boards, most operations remain informal due to high barriers to entry and burdensome formalization requirements.
- International case studies show that a 'race to the bottom' in environmental and social standards can occur if subnational governments compete for investment, a risk often mitigated by setting national minimum standards while devolving implementation.
- Decentralizing licensing to subnational levels without adequate capacity can lead to governance failures, as seen in Indonesia where it resulted in overlapping licenses and insecurity of tenure.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Bauer, A., Kirk, N., & Sahla, S. (2018). Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/federalism-considerations-form-myanmar.pdf
- Chicago
- Bauer, Andrew, Natalie Kirk, and Sebastian Sahla. Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2018. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/federalism-considerations-form-myanmar.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Bauer |first1=Andrew |last2=Kirk |first2=Natalie |last3=Sahla |first3=Sebastian |title=Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=January 2018 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/federalism-considerations-form-myanmar.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000372)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{bauer2018natural, author = {Bauer, Andrew and Kirk, Natalie and Sahla, Sebastian}, title = {{Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2018}, month = jan, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/federalism-considerations-form-myanmar.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000372} }
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