Examen de la propriété réelle : mesures pratiques pour réduire les risques de corruption dans les procédures d’octroi de licences extractives

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The document argues that while many resource-rich countries prohibit government officials from holding interests in extractive companies, they lack the regulatory mechanisms to verify these interests during the licensing process. It proposes a five-step framework—anti-corruption provisions, pre-selection/submission, initial screening, adjudication procedures, and complementary measures—to identify and disqualify companies with problematic beneficial ownership. The authors emphasize the need for clear definitions of 'beneficial owner' and 'politically exposed person' (PEP), the use of open-data registries, and the implementation of 'red flag' checklists to detect hidden ownership structures used to facilitate corruption.

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  • A study of over fifty mining and oil laws revealed that while approximately half prohibit government officials or their close associates (PEPs) from holding interests in companies applying for extractive licenses, none of the laws require regulators to actually verify the existence of such interests during the evaluation process.
  • The document recommends a broad definition of 'beneficial owner' as any natural person who directly or indirectly exercises significant control, possesses a significant economic interest, or receives a significant economic benefit from a company, rather than relying on a fixed percentage of formal shareholding.
  • To prevent the exclusion of high-risk owners, the authors suggest a 5% threshold for ownership, benefit, or interest as a balanced limit for disclosure, while requiring the disclosure of all PEPs regardless of whether they meet this threshold.
  • The briefing identifies several 'red flags' indicating hidden problematic ownership, including the use of shell company networks, professional nominees, bearer shares, and the presence of shareholders with modest occupations whose income is inconsistent with their investment.
  • Effective anti-corruption measures in licensing should include the mandatory submission of anti-corruption certificates and the public disclosure of beneficial ownership information in an open format shortly after the application deadline.
  • The document suggests that regulators should have the legal authority to revoke licenses if it is discovered after the award that a company provided false, misleading, or incomplete information regarding its beneficial ownership.
  • The authors propose a specific definition for Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) that includes heads of state, ministers, sector administrators, politicians, military officials, and agents of state-owned enterprises, as well as their immediate family members and close associates.
  • The briefing highlights that national non-sector-specific beneficial ownership registries, such as the one in the United Kingdom, can complement but not replace sector-specific risk assessments during the licensing process.

Cite the original document

APA
Westenberg, E., & Sayne, A. (2018). Examen de la propriété réelle : mesures pratiques pour réduire les risques de corruption dans les procédures d’octroi de licences extractives. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/examen-de-la-propriete-reelle.pdf
Chicago
Westenberg, Erica, and Aaron Sayne. Examen de la propriété réelle : mesures pratiques pour réduire les risques de corruption dans les procédures d’octroi de licences extractives. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2018. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/examen-de-la-propriete-reelle.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Westenberg |first1=Erica |last2=Sayne |first2=Aaron |title=Examen de la propriété réelle : mesures pratiques pour réduire les risques de corruption dans les procédures d’octroi de licences extractives |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=May 2018 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/examen-de-la-propriete-reelle.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000362)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{westenberg2018examen, author = {Westenberg, Erica and Sayne, Aaron}, title = {{Examen de la propriété réelle : mesures pratiques pour réduire les risques de corruption dans les procédures d’octroi de licences extractives}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2018}, month = may, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/examen-de-la-propriete-reelle.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000362} }

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