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In 2021, MDB climate finance to developing countries reached a record $58.9 billion (UNFCCC definition), hitting a collective 2025 target of $50 billion four years early. However, the report highlights significant failures: private sector co-financing rates fell to 25 cents per dollar of public finance, and the share of funding for the most vulnerable countries (SIDS and LDCs) dropped to 19% from 22% in 2020. Additionally, MDBs provided $4.6 billion in fossil fuel financing in 2021, including a $4.5 billion loan for oil and LNG imports from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan. The author urges MDBs to increase adaptation finance, which reached $17.6 billion but remains far below estimated annual costs of $70 billion, and calls for independent verification of self-reported data to improve transparency.

The document details the re-accreditation reviews for three international entities: the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). All three entities are recommended for re-accreditation without conditions. ADB and EBRD are recommended for 'large' project sizes and 'high risk' (Category A/I-1) environmental and social (E&S) risk categories. UNEP is recommended for an upgrade to 'medium' project size and maintains a 'medium risk' (Category B/I-2) E&S category. The assessments cover fiduciary standards, E&S safeguards, gender policies, and the entities' overall climate portfolios, noting that all three have aligned their strategies with the Paris Agreement and GCF's 2020–2023 Strategic Plan.

The report demonstrates that Europe can achieve a 94-96% clean power system by 2035 at no extra cost compared to stated policies, provided wind and solar deployment quadruples. This transition would enable wider electrification, potentially halving fossil fuel consumption by 2030 and saving between €530 billion and €1 trillion by 2035. Key requirements include expanding interconnection, deploying electrolysers for green hydrogen, and phasing out coal by 2030 and unabated baseload gas after 2025.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced European states to prioritize energy security over climate goals, leading to a 'dash for LNG' that outbids developing nations and encourages a global return to coal. This shift undermines EU climate leadership and risks 'locking in' long-term fossil fuel infrastructure in Africa and Asia.

The author argues that Serbia has transitioned toward autocracy, a process accelerated by the state's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. The government is accused of using a state of emergency to bypass scientific advice, manipulate health data, and conduct an unofficial election campaign. This democratic decline is mirrored by deteriorating rule of law and media freedom. However, the document notes a rising wave of political mobilisation fueled by dissatisfaction with environmental degradation, specifically air pollution in Belgrade and proposed lithium mining by Rio Tinto in western Serbia.

The research examines how NATO's airstrike-only intervention during the Kosovo War affected Albanian civilian victimization. Using a novel dataset (Kosovo Airstrike Locator) and the Kosovo Memory Book, the author finds that while the overall introduction of airstrikes coincided with a dramatic increase in civilian deaths, recently struck municipalities actually saw a decrease in expected victimization. However, this direct effect was offset by indirect consequences: the shift in strike strategy to target military units intensified the violence following battles and KLA soldier deaths, and shifted the geography of victimization toward more populous areas and those with lower Albanian population percentages. The author concludes that airstrike-only interventions can intensify conflict and increase civilian vulnerability, suggesting they should not be the primary tool for protecting civilians without a credible ground-force threat.

The document analyzes the EU's trajectory toward a coal phase-out by 2030. While overall planned coal generation in the EU is expected to drop by 83% from 2015 to 2030, a small group of countries—Poland, Czechia, and Bulgaria—will remain the primary polluters, accounting for over 95% of the EU's planned coal electricity generation in 2030. The report highlights the disparity between these 'laggards' and the rest of the EU-27, noting that while most countries are aligning with 1.5C goals, Poland, Czechia, and Bulgaria have set phase-out dates far beyond 2030.

The document analyzes the projected decline of coal-fired power in the EU by 2030, noting that while most member states are rapidly transitioning, Poland, Czechia, and Bulgaria will account for over 95% of the EU's planned coal electricity production by that year. It emphasizes that Germany's commitment to exit coal by 2030 isolates these three countries, whose combined coal reduction (42% from 2015 to 2030) lags significantly behind the 99% reduction seen in the other 27 EU nations.

The report finds that while the EU is rapidly reducing coal use, with planned generation falling by 83% between 2015 and 2030, three countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria—will account for over 95% of the EU's remaining coal electricity by 2030. Germany's decision to exit coal by 2030 has accelerated this trend, leaving these three 'laggards' with significantly slower phase-out rates compared to the rest of the EU.

The EU is rapidly phasing out coal, with planned electricity generation from coal expected to fall by 83% between 2015 and 2030. However, Poland, Czechia, and Bulgaria are transitioning much more slowly, and are projected to be responsible for over 95% of the EU's planned coal-generated electricity in 2030.

The report finds that while the EU is rapidly reducing coal power, with planned production falling by 83% between 2015 and 2030, three countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria—will account for over 95% of the EU's planned coal electricity generation by 2030. Germany's commitment to exit coal by 2030 has further isolated these three nations, which are phasing out coal significantly slower than the rest of the EU-27.

The Cooling Facility aims to integrate gender equality into sustainable cooling investments across Bangladesh, El Salvador, Kenya, Malawi, North Macedonia, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. The report identifies systemic gender gaps in labor force participation, financial access, and STEM education, while noting that women are disproportionately affected by limited access to cooling. It proposes a strategic approach involving sex-disaggregated data collection, targeted financial products for female entrepreneurs, and capacity building to increase women's roles as employees and consumers in the cooling sector.

The analysis finds a growing trend of countries incorporating fossil fuel production into their national climate communications, with some establishing pathways for managed decline. However, a significant number of countries still plan for continued or expanded production, and many fail to address the equity and economic diversification needs of a just transition.

A small number of countries, primarily Turkey, Ukraine, and those in the Western Balkans, are responsible for the majority of coal power air pollution in Europe. Ukraine dominates PM10 emissions, while Turkey leads in NOx pollution. The report highlights that most of the most polluting plants are over 30 years old, though Turkey is an exception with some young plants among the top polluters. Many Energy Community countries failed to meet 2019 emission ceilings, and the report argues that subsidies and rehabilitation costs should instead be redirected toward the region's significant renewable energy potential.

The analysis asserts that the current environmental acquis of the Energy Community Treaty is inadequate to prevent biodiversity loss and water deterioration caused by energy projects. It recommends the adoption of selected articles from the EU Birds, Habitats, and Water Framework Directives, arguing that such measures would not impose significant additional burdens since many Contracting Parties already have existing obligations under the Bern Convention or EU accession processes. The document details the specific risks posed by various energy sources—including coal, nuclear, wind, and hydropower—and provides a tailored legal framework for implementation within the Energy Community.

The report provides a comprehensive overview of European CO2 storage capacity, highlighting the North Sea Basin and the Norwegian shelf as the most prospective areas. It details storage potentials in saline aquifers, hydrocarbon fields, and storage reservoirs across various European regions, while also mapping stationary emission sources, noting that power generation is the dominant emitting sector.

The report 'Together for Safety 21 Ways Forward' outlines strategies for urban leaders to combat extremism and polarisation, exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. It identifies trends such as the 'gamification of extremism' and the use of conspiracy theories by right-wing and jihadist groups to target minorities and youth. The document provides 21 guiding principles across four themes: preventing extremism post-pandemic, countering online hate, securing public spaces, and empowering youth. Key recommendations include adopting evidence-based 'hot spot mapping', investing in youth-led organisations, and strengthening mental health initiatives to build community resilience.

The Sub-national Climate Finance Initiative (SnCF) is designed as a blended finance private equity fund paired with a grant-funded Technical Assistance Facility (TAF) to support mid-sized sustainable infrastructure in developing countries. The Fund targets a total raise of USD 750 million, consisting of a USD 150 million concessional tranche and USD 600 million in commercial capital, aiming to invest in sustainable energy, waste and sanitation, and nature-based solutions. The TAF, targeting USD 28 million, focuses on project preparation, impact certification via Gold Standard, and local government capacity building. The initiative aims to mobilize up to USD 3.8 billion in total finance, with a target of 35-50 projects across up to 20 countries. Key target markets identified include Chile, South Africa, North Macedonia, Mexico, and Jordan. The Fund projects a net IRR of 9.4% for commercial investors and 5.4% for the concessional tranche, with a goal to avoid 77 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent over the infrastructure lifetime.

The document identifies the Technical Assistance (TA) Facility for the Global Subnational Climate Fund as a Category I-2 environmental and social safeguards project. It lists target countries across Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean, and confirms that an Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) has been disclosed in multiple languages to comply with requirements.

The analysis examines the shift in Germany's relationship with the Visegrad Group from one of normative leadership to pragmatic economic cooperation. While economic ties remain strong, political rifts over democracy, the rule of law, and migration have eroded Berlin's influence. The author argues that Germany's avoidance of these contentious issues to protect geoeconomic interests hampers the EU's collective sovereignty and effectiveness, particularly as Germany prepares for its 2020 EU presidency.