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The authors argue that CAFTA's investment chapter grants foreign investors greater substantive rights than U.S. investors, violating the Trade Act of 2002. They specifically criticize the lack of an appellate review mechanism, the absence of a general environmental exception, and the use of subjective standards like "fair and equitable treatment" which they claim could undermine democratic governance and environmental protections.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) approved a friendly settlement on October 17, 2003, between the State of Chile and Mapuche Pehuenche families affected by the Ralco Hydroelectric Project. The dispute centered on the flooding of ancestral lands and the application of electrical laws over indigenous land laws. The final agreement includes commitments for constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples, the ratification of ILO Convention 169, the creation of a new commune in Alto Bío Bío, and specific land and financial compensations for the affected families.

The authors argue that while the U.S.-Australia FTA's lack of an investor-state dispute mechanism is positive, the substantive investment provisions still grant foreign investors rights exceeding those of domestic investors under U.S. law. They highlight risks to environmental regulation, the lack of a general environmental exception, and the subjective nature of 'fair and equitable treatment' standards.

The document examines the legal precedent established in RICHTERSVELD COMMUNITY v ALEXKOR LTD & ANOTHER [2004], confirming that the Land Claims Court has the authority to order defendants to compensate for or repair environmental damage to land subject to a restitution claim. It establishes that dispossession of land includes the loss of mineral rights and that the court can grant both restoration of land and equitable redress, including monetary compensation for environmental degradation to return the claimant to their original position.

The report evaluates Estonia's implementation of the Aarhus Convention's three pillars: access to information, public participation, and access to justice. It finds that while legal frameworks are generally in place and information quality is high, practical implementation varies. Access to information is stronger than public participation, which often occurs too late in the decision-making process to be substantive. Access to justice is recognized by courts, allowing environmental NGOs to challenge decisions. The report recommends clearer procedures for emergency notifications, better accessibility of corporate pollution data, and more inclusive, early-stage public consultations.

The report analyzes how Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) operate within the OECD Arrangement and the WTO's ASCM, highlighting a 'safe haven' clause that protects OECD members from subsidy prohibitions. It details the Brazil-Canada aircraft disputes to illustrate the difficulties developing countries face in challenging secretive ECA practices. The document argues that ECAs lack sufficient environmental and social guidelines, though it notes a slow trend toward improved sustainability standards.

The document argues that the human right to water requires states to maintain regulatory autonomy and flexibility, which may conflict with the trade liberalization goals of the WTO's GATS. It specifically examines how market access commitments, national treatment obligations, and proposed disciplines on domestic regulation could restrict a government's ability to use public monopolies, implement universal service obligations, or maintain environmental zoning and quality standards. The authors propose a 'progressive approach' where trade law is interpreted in deference to national regulatory autonomy to ensure that basic services are not left to the 'whim of markets'.

The document argues that the GATS creates a 'lock-in' effect that conflicts with the flexibility required for adaptive water management. It identifies twelve areas of potential conflict, including market access restrictions on water extraction, the use of technical standards for pollution control, and the requirement for sustainability impact assessments. The authors recommend that WTO members refrain from new commitments in water-sensitive sectors and amend the GATS to include a specific environmental exception for natural resources.

The document examines the legal tension between the Calvo doctrine, which subjects foreign investment to host-state domestic law, and the international minimum standard of treatment (MST). It details the transition from the restrictive 'Neer standard'—which required an 'outrage' to prove a violation—to more flexible interpretations in NAFTA Chapter XI cases like Mondev and Loewen. The report highlights the role of the Free Trade Commission's (FTC) 2001 Note of Interpretation in attempting to bind tribunals to customary international law and warns that abandoning the 'bad faith' requirement for MST breaches threatens good governance by allowing arbitrary second-guessing of sovereign regulatory actions.

The document argues that shifting from a strict 'necessity' test to a 'proportionality' test in WTO dispute settlements would transfer the power to balance trade interests against public policy goals from domestic democratic institutions to WTO panels and the Appellate Body. It specifically warns that proposed changes to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) could allow the WTO to outlaw domestic measures it deems 'out of balance' with their objectives, potentially undermining protections for the environment, human health, and consumers.

The paper argues that while GATS does not explicitly mandate privatization, its market access and national treatment obligations can indirectly encourage it and limit a government's capacity to implement universal service obligations (USOs) and subsidies. By analyzing environmental services commitments from the US, Estonia, the EC, and Nordic/Swiss countries, the authors demonstrate how specific 'carve-outs' and conditions in schedules can preserve regulatory flexibility. The document highlights the particular risk to developing countries, where privatization is often driven by international financial institutions, potentially locking them into GATS commitments that hinder the fulfillment of the human right to water.

The report examines the global landscape of GMO import regulations, noting a concentration of commercial acreage in the US, Argentina, Canada, and China, while many developing nations face regulatory blockages. It details the stringent regimes in the EU and Australia/New Zealand, the more flexible approach in the US, and varying levels of adoption and restriction in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The document further analyzes potential conflicts between these national regulations—specifically regarding traceability, labelling, and the precautionary principle—and WTO agreements such as the SPS, TBT, and GATT, as well as the influence of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.

The document examines the intersection of international trade law and water management, arguing that while states maintain formal jurisdiction over water, investment agreements can severely limit their regulatory autonomy. It highlights risks such as the 'locking-in' of weak domestic water regimes and the use of investor-state arbitration to challenge environmental regulations or water usage limits. The author advocates for treating water as a special resource in negotiations, improving domestic legal frameworks before privatizing services, and increasing transparency in investment disputes.

The report examines GMO import regulations in the EU, USA, Australia, New Zealand, Asia, Latin America, and Africa, comparing them against WTO agreements. It highlights the tension between the EU's stringent traceability and labelling requirements and the more permissive approach of the US, while analyzing how the 'precautionary principle' and 'substantial equivalence' impact trade disputes.

The document argues that the combined influence of International Financial Institutions (IFIs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) creates a mechanism that forces developing nations toward the privatization of water services. It asserts that while privatization is presented as a universal solution for water scarcity, it often fails the poor and marginalized, as seen in South Africa and Bolivia. The text emphasizes that access to water is a fundamental human right, and that international legal frameworks can 'trap' governments by making liberalization irreversible and exposing them to costly international arbitration (such as through ICSID) if they attempt to re-regulate or reverse privatization to protect public health and human rights.

The document argues that the State of Chile violated the fundamental rights of the Mapuche-Pehuenche communities of Ralco-Lepoy and Quepuca Ralco through the construction of the Ralco hydroelectric plant, which led to the destruction of ancestral lands, cemeteries, and ceremonial spaces. It contends that domestic legal remedies in Chile have been ineffective, illusory, or subject to unjustifiable delays, thereby satisfying the requirements for the admissibility of the petition before the IACHR. The text further argues that the project was economically inefficient and driven by the monopolistic interests of the company Endesa rather than public interest. Additionally, it details systemic discrimination against indigenous peoples in Chile's political and judicial systems, including the use of anti-terrorist and state security laws to criminalize indigenous demands.

The document examines the proliferation of bilateral and regional investment treaties, highlighting how they limit the ability of host states to regulate for public health and the environment. It critiques the investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism for its lack of transparency and the use of 'indirect expropriation' claims to challenge environmental laws. The author recommends that new governance principles for foreign direct investment in hazardous activities ensure public transparency in arbitration, public consultation on host government agreements, and a commitment by companies to abide by evolving environmental and health legislation.

The document proposes a comprehensive Cotonou Investment Agreement to replace existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and better align foreign direct investment with the sustainable development goals of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). It argues that current international investment agreements focus too narrowly on investor protection and lack empirical evidence of benefiting developing countries. The proposed agreement would balance investor rights with host state obligations and public goods, incorporating principles of legitimacy, transparency, and accountability. Key recommendations include the establishment of an Observatory for ACP Investment to monitor results, a Cotonou Investment Fund to support small and medium enterprises, and the use of regional institutions to manage environmental reviews and competition authorities. The author emphasizes the need for a dispute settlement mechanism that requires the exhaustion of domestic remedies and shows deference to public policy goals, moving away from current models like ICSID or UNCITRAL.

The document examines the tension between the protections granted to foreign investors under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and the human rights obligations of host states. It highlights a surge in investor-state disputes, particularly in the water and sewage sectors in Latin America, where the 'right to water' may serve as a legal defense for state regulation. The paper argues that current BITs are largely silent on human rights and lack transparency, which may lead to 'regulatory chill' or the prioritization of investor rights over public interest. It suggests reforms, including the inclusion of minimum human rights responsibilities for investors and the potential use of human rights courts to resolve investment disputes.

The document argues that NAFTA's Chapter 11 provisions are interpreted too broadly, potentially creating a 'regulatory chill' where governments avoid public welfare regulations to avoid compensating foreign investors. It highlights a lack of transparency and accountability in the investor-state dispute mechanism, which follows a commercial arbitration model rather than a public justice model. The author examines three reform options—interpretive statements, environment, health, and safety (EH&S) exceptions, and full amendment—concluding that only a comprehensive amendment can fully address both substantive and process-related shortcomings.