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The report analyzes how Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) operate within the OECD Arrangement and the WTO's ASCM, highlighting a 'safe haven' clause that protects OECD members from subsidy prohibitions. It details the Brazil-Canada aircraft disputes to illustrate the difficulties developing countries face in challenging secretive ECA practices. The document argues that ECAs lack sufficient environmental and social guidelines, though it notes a slow trend toward improved sustainability standards.

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  • The OECD Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits acts as a 'gentleman’s agreement' designed to prevent ECAs from competing on financial conditions by setting limits on interest rates, repayment terms, and premiums.
  • A 'safe haven' clause in item (k) of Annex I to the WTO ASCM exempts export credit practices that conform to the interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement from being classified as prohibited export subsidies.
  • Developing countries are disadvantaged by the OECD Arrangement because they lack the economic power to compete on the same terms and face higher costs due to lower credit ratings, yet are forced to phase out their own export credits under Article 27.4 ASCM if they do not follow the Arrangement.
  • The Brazil-Canada aircraft disputes revealed that the burden of proof in WTO challenges rests with the plaintiff, making it difficult for developing countries to prove subsidies when developed nations refuse to disclose secretive ECA data.
  • The WTO Appellate Body determined that the OECD Arrangement can serve as a market benchmark to assess 'material advantage' under item (k) of the ASCM, but its role as a benchmark for 'benefit' under Article 1.1 ASCM remains unclear.
  • ECAs are identified as major sources of public finance for foreign investment in the developing world but often operate without binding environmental or social guidelines, leading to projects with 'catastrophic consequences' for local communities and the environment, such as the Three Gorges Dam in China and Sakhalin II in Russia.

Cite the original document

APA
Center for International Environmental Law (2003). Draft Issue Brief. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ECAs_WTO_Nov03.pdf
Chicago
Center for International Environmental Law. Draft Issue Brief. 2003. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ECAs_WTO_Nov03.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Center for International Environmental Law |title=Draft Issue Brief |date=November 2003 |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ECAs_WTO_Nov03.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{centerforinternationalenvironmentallaw2003draft, author = {{Center for International Environmental Law}}, title = {{Draft Issue Brief}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {2003}, month = nov, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ECAs_WTO_Nov03.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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