Beneficial Ownership in the Fishing Sector and Links to Corruption

The document argues that the lack of transparency regarding beneficial owners—the individuals exercising ultimate effective control over fishing vessels and facilities—is a primary enabler of corruption and IUU fishing. It details how 'flags of convenience' (FoCs), shell companies, and opaque joint ventures allow bad actors to evade sanctions, launder money, and engage in human rights abuses. The author highlights specific cases, such as the 'Fishrot' scandal in Namibia and the use of Chinese processing facilities to hide North Korean labor. To address these issues, the briefing recommends that governments implement public beneficial ownership registries, verify disclosed data, and that major market states like the US, EU, and Japan make beneficial ownership transparency a condition for seafood import access.

• The use of 'flags of convenience' (FoCs) allows vessel owners to register ships in states with lax registration and minimal enforcement, regardless of the owner's residence or ties to that country. This practice functions as a form of 'legal corruption,' enabling operators to avoid taxes and regulatory oversight.
• There is a strong correlation between tax havens and illegal fishing; while only 4% of all registered fishing vessels fly the flag of a tax haven, 70% of vessels involved in IUU fishing have been flagged in such jurisdictions.
• Complex corporate structures, including shell companies and 'flag hopping' (changing registration countries), are used to insulate beneficial owners from scrutiny, allowing them to maintain operations even after being convicted of illegal fishing.
• Joint ventures in developing countries, particularly in Africa, are often used as mechanisms for corruption, allowing foreign companies to bribe officials for resource access or enabling government insiders to enrich themselves through front companies.
• The 'Fishrot' scandal in Namibia demonstrated how an Icelandic company, Samherji, used front men to appear majority Namibian-owned while paying millions in bribes to high-ranking officials to acquire fishing licenses.

APA

Freitas, B. (2021). Beneficial Ownership in the Fishing Sector and Links to Corruption. WWF International. https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/1291/18ar730zse_BO_fishing_FINAL2.pdf

Chicago

Freitas, Ben. Beneficial Ownership in the Fishing Sector and Links to Corruption. WWF International, 2021. https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/1291/18ar730zse_BO_fishing_FINAL2.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Freitas |first1=Ben |title=Beneficial Ownership in the Fishing Sector and Links to Corruption |publisher=WWF International |date=December 2021 |url=https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/1291/18ar730zse_BO_fishing_FINAL2.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{freitas2021beneficial, author = {Freitas, Ben}, title = {{Beneficial Ownership in the Fishing Sector and Links to Corruption}}, institution = {WWF International}, year = {2021}, month = dec, url = {https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/1291/18ar730zse_BO_fishing_FINAL2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }