Some Questions about Violence and Decentralization; A Preliminary Exploration of the Case of Indonesia

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The document investigates how decentralization in Indonesia has interacted with existing social power structures and histories of violence to create new conflicts over resource control. It argues that decentralization is not a neutral administrative shift but a process that can normalize violence, empower new ethnic elites, and facilitate illegal resource extraction when not accompanied by effective law enforcement and reinvestment guidelines. The author highlights the role of 'preman' (thugs) and the continued involvement of the military in illegal logging, suggesting that the shift from a centralized 'preman state' to a decentralized system has often merely replaced one set of elites with another.

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  • Decentralization can trigger violence when it shifts power to local authorities in contexts where previous claimants used violence to control resources, or where the stakes for resource access are high and effective mediation mechanisms are absent.
  • In Indonesia, decentralization has been used by 'new ethnic elites' as a smoke screen to violently establish new power structures at the district level, often utilizing cultural symbols and rituals of violence to justify their claims.
  • The transition to decentralization has seen a normalization of 'horizontal' conflict, where violence is displaced from the relationship between the people and the state to conflicts between different groups within the same locality.
  • The Indonesian security forces (military and police) are deeply implicated in illegal resource extraction, with the military expected to raise approximately 50% of its budget through such activities.
  • In the district of Kotawaringin Timur, decentralization led to the quasi-legalization of illegal logging, where taxes on illegal timber provided more revenue for the district than legal logging, oil palm, or gold mining combined.
  • The author argues that violent conflict is more likely to occur under conditions of resource abundance rather than scarcity, contradicting some political science theories.

Cite the original document

APA
Peluso, N. (2002). Some Questions about Violence and Decentralization; A Preliminary Exploration of the Case of Indonesia. World Resources Institute. http://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pdf/eaa_decent_peluso.pdf
Chicago
Peluso, Nancy. Some Questions about Violence and Decentralization; A Preliminary Exploration of the Case of Indonesia. World Resources Institute, 2002. http://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pdf/eaa_decent_peluso.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Peluso |first1=Nancy |title=Some Questions about Violence and Decentralization; A Preliminary Exploration of the Case of Indonesia |publisher=World Resources Institute |date=February 2002 |url=http://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pdf/eaa_decent_peluso.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{peluso2002some, author = {Peluso, Nancy}, title = {{Some Questions about Violence and Decentralization; A Preliminary Exploration of the Case of Indonesia}}, institution = {World Resources Institute}, year = {2002}, month = feb, url = {http://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pdf/eaa_decent_peluso.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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