Actors, Powers and Environmental Accountability in Uganda’s Decentralisation

The document argues that while Uganda has a participatory-oriented decentralization framework, actual decision-making powers over protected environmental resources remain centralized. Collaborative management schemes are characterized as 'de-concentration' rather than true decentralization, as they lack decision-making authority and often serve to legitimate central government policies. This lack of genuine power at the local level, combined with corruption in the forestry department and the marginalization of women and youth, is found to hinder sustainable environmental outcomes and social equity.

• Despite the legal framework for decentralization, the central government re-centralized legislative and management powers over protected area resources (forests and wildlife) in 1995, reversing a 1993 transfer of authority.
• Collaborative management schemes in areas such as Bwindi Impenetrable forest, Mt Elgon Forest Park, Budongo Forest reserve, and Mabira Forest Reserve do not grant decision-making power to local communities; instead, they function as advisory mechanisms where the central government retains final authority.
• The current management of protected resources marginalizes women and youth, as the central government often enforces resource access quotas that are insufficient for community survival.
• Commercial harvesting of resources on public land requires permits issued by the forestry department rather than local governments, a system that facilitates corruption and social inequality by allowing wealthy permit holders to exploit rural producers.
• Local governments have very limited environmental powers, such as managing forest reserves smaller than 100 hectares and passing bye-laws that must not contradict national laws, but they often lack the technical and financial resources to implement these functions independently.
• Environmental action plans developed by local populations are often driven by a desire for donor funding and poverty alleviation rather than long-term environmental protection, a trend sometimes encouraged by local councilors seeking popularity.

APA

Bazaara, N. (2002). Actors, Powers and Environmental Accountability in Uganda’s Decentralisation. World Resources Institute. http://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pdf/eaa_decent_bazaara.pdf

Chicago

Bazaara, Nyangabyaki. Actors, Powers and Environmental Accountability in Uganda’s Decentralisation. World Resources Institute, 2002. http://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pdf/eaa_decent_bazaara.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Bazaara |first1=Nyangabyaki |title=Actors, Powers and Environmental Accountability in Uganda’s Decentralisation |publisher=World Resources Institute |date=2002 |url=http://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pdf/eaa_decent_bazaara.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{bazaara2002actors, author = {Bazaara, Nyangabyaki}, title = {{Actors, Powers and Environmental Accountability in Uganda’s Decentralisation}}, institution = {World Resources Institute}, year = {2002}, url = {http://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pdf/eaa_decent_bazaara.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }