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The report examines how the lack of a global competition law framework creates gaps and overlaps in the enforcement of antitrust rules across global value chains. It highlights specific tensions in the digital sector, intellectual property licensing, and the role of state-owned enterprises, while arguing that competition law is an inefficient tool for pursuing distributional or social goals. The author recommends deeper regional cooperation, legal convergence on the abuse of dominance, and the abolition of export cartel exemptions in developed countries.

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  • While competition law has globalized with over 100 jurisdictions now applying it, there are no global rules, only a "patchwork of competition jurisdictions" and regional arrangements like the European Union.
  • Enforcement consistency varies by area: cartel enforcement is the most consistent, whereas the "abuse of dominance" is the least consistently enforced area globally, with significant divergence between US and EU approaches.
  • Global value chains face enforcement gaps due to practical constraints, such as the inability of authorities to obtain information from foreign firms; a 2012 OECD and ICN survey found half of responding agencies had never cooperated with a foreign counterpart to facilitate a case.
  • Digital markets present unique challenges because they lack a geographic footprint and often exhibit "network effects," leading to a divide between the US approach of caution and the EU approach of acting to preserve competition.
  • Competition law is considered a "crude and inefficient instrument" for pursuing distributional or social aims, such as upgrading a country's participation in a GVC or redistributing value-added between producers.
  • State-owned enterprises (SOEs) create distortions in competition, and while some countries like India have fined SOEs for abuse of position, achieving "competitive neutrality" globally remains a complex process.

Cite the original document

APA
Davies, J. (2018). Competition. World Economic Forum. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WP_Global_Value_Chain_Policy_Series_Competition_report_2018.pdf
Chicago
Davies, John. Competition. World Economic Forum, 2018. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WP_Global_Value_Chain_Policy_Series_Competition_report_2018.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Davies |first1=John |title=Competition |publisher=World Economic Forum |date=June 2018 |url=http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WP_Global_Value_Chain_Policy_Series_Competition_report_2018.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{davies2018competition, author = {Davies, John}, title = {{Competition}}, institution = {World Economic Forum}, year = {2018}, month = jun, url = {http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WP_Global_Value_Chain_Policy_Series_Competition_report_2018.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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