Shielded from Oversight

The report argues that the US Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is in a state of disarray due to a 'schedule-driven' development process that bypassed standard DOD5000 acquisition rules. This approach led to the fielding of interceptors before successful testing, systemic design flaws like the 'track gate anomaly', and a poor test record where only a third of intercept tests have succeeded since deployment began. The authors conclude that the system cannot reliably protect the US from nuclear attack and may increase security risks by encouraging adversaries to modernize their arsenals.

• The George W. Bush administration exempted the GMD system from standard DOD5000 acquisition rules and oversight to accelerate deployment, allowing the Pentagon to field systems without operational testing.
• The GMD system has a poor test record, with only eight successful intercepts out of 17 total tests, and only three successes out of nine tests since deployment began in 2004.
• Most of the 30 fielded interceptors use the CE-I kill vehicle, which has had only two successful intercept tests in four attempts, with the most recent test failing.
• The CE-II kill vehicle was fielded in January 2010 before any successful intercept tests were conducted; it took over five and a half years after fielding began to achieve a successful intercept.
• The GMD system suffers from systemic design flaws, including the 'track gate anomaly'—a guidance system vulnerability to divert thruster vibrations—and defective wiring susceptible to corrosion.
• Testing has been conducted under simplified, scripted conditions and has not demonstrated effectiveness against realistic threats such as tumbling warheads, credible decoys, or ICBM-range targets.
• The GMD system lacks sufficient mid-course discrimination capabilities to distinguish warheads from decoys or debris, a deficiency that would require substantial changes to the system's architecture to fix.
• The pursuit of the GMD system may decrease US security by encouraging adversaries like China and Russia to modernize their arsenals and by potentially leading US leaders to pursue riskier foreign policies based on an overestimated defensive capability.

APA

Grego, L., Lewis, G. N., & Wright, D. (2016). Shielded from Oversight. Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-full-report.pdf

Chicago

Grego, Laura, George N. Lewis, and David Wright. Shielded from Oversight. Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-full-report.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Grego |first1=Laura |last2=Lewis |first2=George N. |last3=Wright |first3=David |title=Shielded from Oversight |publisher=Union of Concerned Scientists |date=July 2016 |url=https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-full-report.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{grego2016shielded, author = {Grego, Laura and Lewis, George N. and Wright, David}, title = {{Shielded from Oversight}}, institution = {Union of Concerned Scientists}, year = {2016}, month = jul, url = {https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-full-report.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }