The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2011
Summary
The report analyzes 15 significant safety-related 'near-misses' at U.S. nuclear plants in 2011, arguing that many resulted from owners tolerating known safety problems. While it highlights successful NRC interventions at the Fort Calhoun, Hatch, and LaSalle plants, it criticizes the agency for allowing 47 reactors to operate in violation of fire-protection regulations and 27 reactors to operate with deficient seismic protection. The author contends that the NRC often focuses on fixing individual equipment failures rather than addressing the systemic weaknesses in owners' testing and inspection regimes.
Key insights
- In 2011, the NRC reported on 15 significant safety- and security-related events, or 'near-misses,' which prompted the dispatch of special investigative teams (SIT), augmented inspection teams (AIT), or incident inspection teams (IIT).
- Many of the 2011 near-misses occurred because reactor owners either ignored known safety issues or failed to implement adequate corrective measures.
- The NRC is permitting 47 operating U.S. reactors to continue operating despite known violations of fire-protection regulations that date back to 1980.
- The NRC allows 27 reactors to operate even though their safety systems are not designed to protect them from earthquake-related hazards identified in 1996; eight reactors suffer from both fire-protection and seismic protection deficiencies.
- The NRC's Component Design Bases Inspections (CDBIs) are criticized for being too narrow in scope and for failing to force owners to remedy the underlying weaknesses in their testing and inspection regimes.
- Effective NRC oversight in 2011 led to positive safety outcomes at the Fort Calhoun, Hatch, and LaSalle plants, where inspectors identified and forced the correction of significant safety impairments.
- Some near-misses, specifically at Millstone Unit 2 and Pilgrim, were caused by multiple operator errors during routine tasks, raising concerns about their ability to handle severe accidents.
- At the Oconee plant, a backup reactor core cooling system installed in 1983 was found in 2011 to be disabled by high temperatures that would occur during an accident.
Cite the original document
- APA
- LOCHBAUM, D. (2012). The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2011. Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/nrc-nuclear-safety-2011-full-report.pdf
- Chicago
- LOCHBAUM, DAVID. The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2011. Union of Concerned Scientists, 2012. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/nrc-nuclear-safety-2011-full-report.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=LOCHBAUM |first1=DAVID |title=The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2011 |publisher=Union of Concerned Scientists |date=March 2012 |url=https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/nrc-nuclear-safety-2011-full-report.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{lochbaum2012nrc, author = {LOCHBAUM, DAVID}, title = {{The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2011}}, institution = {Union of Concerned Scientists}, year = {2012}, month = mar, url = {https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/nrc-nuclear-safety-2011-full-report.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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