Countermeasures

The report concludes that the planned US National Missile Defense (NMD) system is technically unworkable because any state capable of deploying long-range ballistic missiles could also deploy simple countermeasures to defeat it. The authors identify three primary countermeasures: submunitions for biological or chemical weapons, anti-simulation balloon decoys for nuclear warheads, and cooled shrouds for nuclear warheads. They argue that the NMD system's reliance on hit-to-kill interceptors and infrared sensors makes it vulnerable to these tactics. Furthermore, the report asserts that deploying NMD would destabilize international security by prompting Russia and China to increase their nuclear arsenals or adopt riskier launch-on-warning postures, while potentially driving emerging missile states toward alternative delivery methods like cruise missiles or clandestine smuggling. The authors recommend postponing deployment until the system is successfully tested against realistic countermeasures and suggest focusing on deterrence, diplomacy, and export controls instead.

• The planned NMD system would be ineffective against limited ballistic missile attacks from emerging missile states because any country capable of deploying a long-range missile could also deploy countermeasures to defeat the system.
• Biological or chemical weapons delivered via submunitions—small warheads released shortly after the boost phase—would overwhelm the NMD system's limited number of interceptors and provide more effective dispersal of agents.
• Nuclear warheads can be defeated by 'anti-simulation balloon decoys,' where the warhead is placed inside a metal-coated balloon and released with numerous empty balloons, making the warhead indistinguishable to defense sensors.
• A nuclear warhead covered by a shroud cooled with liquid nitrogen to 77 K would reduce infrared radiation by at least a million times, preventing kill vehicle sensors from detecting and homing on the target.
• The NMD system is technically disadvantaged because the defense must commit to a specific architecture first, must work the first time it is used, and requires much higher accuracy (hit-to-kill) than the offense.
• Deployment of NMD would likely lead Russia to increase its reliance on a launch-on-warning strategy and limit deep reductions in nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the risk of accidental or unauthorized attacks.
• China would likely respond to NMD deployment by increasing the scale and pace of its missile modernization program and deploying more long-range missiles to maintain its deterrent.
• Emerging missile states might bypass NMD by using alternative delivery methods that are less expensive and more reliable, such as cruise missiles, ship-launched short-range ballistic missiles, or clandestine smuggling.
• The Pentagon's testing program is inadequate because it tests against targets with no credible countermeasures and does not assess operational effectiveness against realistic threats.
• Past US intercept tests that claimed to defeat countermeasures were flawed because the defense knew the distinguishing characteristics of the targets in advance.

APA

Sessler, A. M., Cornwall, J. M., Dietz, B., Fetter, S., Frankel, S., Garwin, R. L., Gottfried, K., Gronlund, L., Lewis, G. N., Postol, T. A., & Wright, D. C. (2000). Countermeasures. Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/countermeasures.pdf

Chicago

Sessler, Andrew M., John M. Cornwall, Bob Dietz, Steve Fetter, Sherman Frankel, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, et al. Countermeasures. Union of Concerned Scientists, 2000. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/countermeasures.pdf.

Wikipedia

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BibTeX

@techreport{sessler2000countermeasures, author = {Sessler, Andrew M. and Cornwall, John M. and Dietz, Bob and Fetter, Steve and Frankel, Sherman and Garwin, Richard L. and Gottfried, Kurt and Gronlund, Lisbeth and Lewis, George N. and Postol, Theodore A. and Wright, David C.}, title = {{Countermeasures}}, institution = {Union of Concerned Scientists}, year = {2000}, month = apr, url = {https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/countermeasures.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }