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The document argues that while a transition from coal is economically inevitable for South Africa, it risks deepening inequalities unless the state implements coordinated support for coal-dependent workers and the Mpumalanga districts.

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  • South Africa's carbon emissions from coal are exceptionally high, with the country emitting approximately seven times the international average of CO2 from coal per person in 2019.
  • The coal value chain is a significant part of the national economy, accounting for 5% of GDP and employing roughly 200,000 workers, nearly half of whom are in mining.
  • Four specific districts in Mpumalanga—eMalahleni, Steve Tshwete, Govan Mbeki, and Msukaligwa—are highly dependent on coal, deriving half of their total value added and a quarter of their employment from the sector.
  • Coal-fuelled electricity has become uncompetitive compared to renewables; for example, renewable electricity cost 10 times the Eskom price in 2011, but cost almost 20% less by 2016.
  • The transition is expected to accelerate from 2025, with an initial decline in coal use for electricity of 10% to 20% in the 2020s, followed by sharper falls in the 2030s and 2040s.
  • Based on the 50-year decommissioning cycle of Eskom plants, the transition could lead to approximately 20,000 coal mining job losses in every decade through 2050.
  • Governance of the coal value chain is fragmented across multiple state agencies, which has historically fostered coal dependency and now hinders a coordinated just transition.
  • A successful just transition requires a five-phase approach starting with laying foundations (2021-2022), gearing up (2022-2025), setting up learning systems (2025-2030), scaling up (2030-2040), and final successful transition (2040-2050).
  • The transition faces risks from proposed new coal projects, such as the 3.3 GW plant at the Musina Makhado Special Economic Zone, which could make national emissions targets unachievable.

Cite the original document

APA
Makgetla, N. (2021). THE JUST TRANSITION IN COAL. Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies. https://tips.org.za/images/Working_Paper_PCC_The_Just_Transition_in_coal_2021.pdf
Chicago
Makgetla, Neva. THE JUST TRANSITION IN COAL. Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies, 2021. https://tips.org.za/images/Working_Paper_PCC_The_Just_Transition_in_coal_2021.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Makgetla |first1=Neva |title=THE JUST TRANSITION IN COAL |publisher=Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies |date=September 2021 |url=https://tips.org.za/images/Working_Paper_PCC_The_Just_Transition_in_coal_2021.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document tipsza-000704)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{makgetla2021just, author = {Makgetla, Neva}, title = {{THE JUST TRANSITION IN COAL}}, institution = {Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies}, year = {2021}, month = sep, url = {https://tips.org.za/images/Working_Paper_PCC_The_Just_Transition_in_coal_2021.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document tipsza-000704} }

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