REDD Integrity

The report examines how existing corruption and weak governance in forest-rich developing countries may undermine REDD objectives and how REDD resource flows could create new incentives for rent-seeking. Through case studies in the DRC, Kenya, and Tanzania, it identifies risks such as 'carbon fraud', elite capture of funds, and the marginalisation of local communities. It suggests that while REDD can act as a catalyst for improving forest governance, success depends on tailored anti-corruption measures, independent monitoring, and the integration of REDD into national development strategies.

• Corruption is a primary driver of deforestation in developing countries, often manifesting as bribes to skew land use plans, facilitate illegal logging without permits, or allow the transport of illegally harvested timber.
• REDD implementation faces two main corruption risks: existing petty and grand corruption that obstructs the establishment of carbon baselines and monitoring, and the potential for new 'resource curse' dynamics where officials extract rents from REDD financial flows.
• In the Democratic Republic of Congo, REDD faces severe obstacles due to 'dysfunctional state-society relations', a history of rewarding 'bad' operators, and a bloated bureaucracy where civil servants use their positions to levy informal taxes.
• Kenya's forest sector suffered a crisis in the 1990s characterized by administrative corruption and large-scale 'land grabbing' by political elites, some of which continues to affect the Mau Forest Complex.
• In Tanzania, forest governance is undermined by petty corruption and patronage networks involving public institutions and the private sector, particularly in the illegal logging and charcoal trades.
• There is a significant risk of 'carbon fraud' in REDD, where data on avoided emissions or reforestation is manipulated to secure funding, necessitating independent verification mechanisms that are currently lacking in some national plans.
• REDD funding may inadvertently marginalise the rural poor if benefits are captured by local elites or if the system encourages the re-centralisation of forest management by governments seeking to appear more reliable to donors.
• Despite the risks, REDD can serve as a catalyst for positive governance reform by increasing funding for forest management, improving data collection, and fostering stakeholder interaction.

APA

Bofin, P., du Preez, M.-L., Standing, A., & Williams, A. (2011). REDD Integrity. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/redd_integrity_drc_cmi_2011.pdf

Chicago

Bofin, Peter, Mari-Lise du Preez, André Standing, and Aled Williams. REDD Integrity. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2011. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/redd_integrity_drc_cmi_2011.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Bofin |first1=Peter |last2=du Preez |first2=Mari-Lise |last3=Standing |first3=André |last4=Williams |first4=Aled |title=REDD Integrity |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=February 2011 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/redd_integrity_drc_cmi_2011.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{bofin2011redd, author = {Bofin, Peter and du Preez, Mari-Lise and Standing, André and Williams, Aled}, title = {{REDD Integrity}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2011}, month = feb, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/redd_integrity_drc_cmi_2011.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }