Russia’s Soft-Power Sources in Africa

The document examines Russia's soft-power strategy in Africa, noting that while Russia is primarily associated with hard power, it leverages Soviet-era legacies, education, and anti-Western narratives to attract African elites and populations. It identifies key strengths in the promotion of multipolarity and traditional values, while highlighting limitations such as insufficient financial resources and the mixed results of vaccine diplomacy.

• Russia's soft power in Africa is a subject of significant debate among experts; some see it as a viable tool for rebuilding influence, while others argue it is limited, non-existent, or confined to specific ruling elites.
• Education serves as a primary cultural soft-power tool, building on a Soviet legacy of training African elites. In the 2020/21 academic year, over 27,000 African students studied at Russian higher education institutions, a fourfold increase since 2010/11.
• Russia utilizes state-funded media outlets like RT and Sputnik to promote pro-Russian narratives and criticize Western 'imperialistic behaviour', finding particular resonance in politically volatile countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic.
• Russia's political appeal is rooted in its promotion of multipolarity, anti-imperialism, and non-interference, positioning itself as an alternative to US unilateralism and Western 'normative imperialism'.
• Moscow leverages a 'conservative' identity to attract religious and traditionalist groups in Africa, opposing Western views on gender roles and reproductive rights through entities like the World Congress of Families and the Russian Orthodox Church.
• Russia's foreign policy legitimacy is bolstered by its image as an assertive actor standing up to the West, though its 'vaccine diplomacy' with Sputnik V has been hindered by production issues and regulatory delays in countries like South Africa and Namibia.
• While Russia provides security services and counter-terrorism support—sometimes via the Wagner Group—its financial and trade capabilities are significantly smaller than China's, with 2020 trade volume reaching $14.5 billion.

APA

Ambrosetti, E. T. (2022). Russia’s Soft-Power Sources in Africa. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Policy-Insights-126-ambrosetti.pdf

Chicago

Ambrosetti, Eleonora Tafuro. Russia’s Soft-Power Sources in Africa. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2022. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Policy-Insights-126-ambrosetti.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Ambrosetti |first1=Eleonora Tafuro |title=Russia’s Soft-Power Sources in Africa |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=March 2022 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Policy-Insights-126-ambrosetti.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{ambrosetti2022russias, author = {Ambrosetti, Eleonora Tafuro}, title = {{Russia’s Soft-Power Sources in Africa}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2022}, month = mar, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Policy-Insights-126-ambrosetti.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }