Still Waiting for the Bonanza: The Oil Business in South Sudan after 2005

The document examines the oil industry in South Sudan following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the country's 2011 independence. It argues that oil revenues have been mismanaged by political elites, leading to endemic corruption and a failure to provide basic services to a population where 90% earn less than a dollar a day. The paper details the economic crisis caused by the January 2012 oil production shutdown, the subsequent austerity measures, and the diplomatic pressure from the US and China that led to the resumption of oil flow in 2013.

• Oil wealth in South Sudan has been concentrated among a small group of government officials and their associates, leaving the general population without tangible benefits.
• Corruption is widespread across all levels of the South Sudanese government, characterized by poor accounting, a lack of procurement laws, and high-profile scandals such as the 'dura' or sorghum saga.
• Despite oil revenues, South Sudan exhibits severe socio-economic deprivation, with a human development indicator of 0.379 and an adult illiteracy rate of 84% for females and 70% for males.
• The January 2012 shutdown of oil production caused a near-economic collapse because oil revenues accounted for 98% of the national income.
• To manage the 2012 economic crisis, the government implemented austerity measures that reduced housing allowances for employees by 50% and eliminated job specification allowances.
• International pressure, specifically from the United States and China, was instrumental in forcing South Sudan and Sudan to reach an oil agreement in August 2012.
• The August 2012 oil deal established that South Sudan would pay $9.10 per barrel for the PDOC pipeline and $11 for the GNOPC pipeline, alongside a $3.2 billion payment to Sudan over three years.
• South Sudan attempted to reduce its dependence on Northern Sudanese infrastructure by exploring pipelines to Kenya and Djibouti and planning local refineries in Unity and Upper Nile states.
• Oil production resumed in April 2013, starting with 10,000 bpd in Block 5A, though the flow remained unstable due to ongoing security disputes with Khartoum.

APA

Moro, L. N. (2013). Still Waiting for the Bonanza: The Oil Business in South Sudan after 2005. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Occasional-Paper-156.pdf

Chicago

Moro, Leben Nelson. Still Waiting for the Bonanza: The Oil Business in South Sudan after 2005. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2013. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Occasional-Paper-156.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Moro |first1=Leben Nelson |title=Still Waiting for the Bonanza: The Oil Business in South Sudan after 2005 |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=October 2013 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Occasional-Paper-156.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{moro2013still, author = {Moro, Leben Nelson}, title = {{Still Waiting for the Bonanza: The Oil Business in South Sudan after 2005}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2013}, month = oct, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Occasional-Paper-156.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }