Les pouvoirs exécutifs non-surveillés : leçons de conception gouvernementale efficace

The document analyzes the tendency of executive branches in African governments to monopolize power, often resulting in the 'big man' cult of personality. It argues that while constitutional frameworks for the separation of powers exist, they are frequently undermined by political realities, lack of resources, and colonial legacies. The author suggests that effective legislative and judicial bodies, supported by an informed and active civil society, are essential to curbing executive abuse and ensuring good governance.

• Executive dominance in Africa is partly attributed to the inheritance of colonial structures that were adapted to local cultures without implementing necessary power controls.
• The executive branch often monopolizes power by controlling the appointment of bureaucrats, heads of national institutes, and oversight bodies, such as Human Rights commissions and anti-corruption commissions.
• Legislative independence is frequently undermined by executive intimidation, financial pressure, patronage, and the ability of the executive to appoint members to parliament, as seen in Ghana under Article 78 of its Constitution.
• The judiciary's ability to monitor the executive is eroded by the executive's control over the appointment, remuneration, and promotion of judges and magistrates.
• The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has highlighted common governance challenges, including the executive's tendency to dominate other branches and a lingering culture of one-party authoritarianism.
• Civil society organizations can act as a counterweight to executive excess if they are provided with information regarding government obligations to citizens.

APA

Mohiddin, A. (2008). Les pouvoirs exécutifs non-surveillés : leçons de conception gouvernementale efficace. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/Occasional-Paper-1-FR.pdf

Chicago

Mohiddin, Ahmed. Les pouvoirs exécutifs non-surveillés : leçons de conception gouvernementale efficace. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2008. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/Occasional-Paper-1-FR.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Mohiddin |first1=Ahmed |title=Les pouvoirs exécutifs non-surveillés : leçons de conception gouvernementale efficace |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=May 2008 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/Occasional-Paper-1-FR.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{mohiddin2008les, author = {Mohiddin, Ahmed}, title = {{Les pouvoirs exécutifs non-surveillés : leçons de conception gouvernementale efficace}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2008}, month = may, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/Occasional-Paper-1-FR.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }