South Africa and FOCAC: Enabling a Partnership for Global Economic Governance Beyond the BRICS?

The document analyzes South Africa's strategic positioning within FOCAC and BRICS, arguing that while FOCAC is a vital tool for continental development and Sino-African relations, it is unlikely to serve as a primary platform for global governance reform in the same way as BRICS. It suggests South Africa should instead focus FOCAC on practical continental issues such as infrastructure quality, natural resource management, and the role of the African Union Commission.

• South Africa views its role in global governance as a 'progressive agent for positive change', seeking to transform a system based on uneven power relations into a rules-based order that is just and equitable. This involves advocating for the reform of the UN Security Council and Bretton Woods institutions, specifically the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
• The relationship between South Africa and China has evolved into a 'comprehensive strategic partnership', characterized by cooperation in trade, investment, and national development priorities. This includes specific agreements on agricultural cooperation (2014–2016), phytosanitary requirements for maize, apples, and dates, and Chinese support for South Africa's industrial agenda in science, technology, and railway parks.
• BRICS and FOCAC serve different strategic functions: BRICS is a coalitional actor focused on redressing global systemic inequities and creating parallel institutions like the New Development Bank (NDB), whereas FOCAC is a formalization of Sino-African relations focused on development diplomacy and a model of cooperation with Africa.
• The author argues that FOCAC is unlikely to become a platform for global governance 'beyond the BRICS' because it is a continental programme with a specific mandate for African development, and China prefers larger multilateral platforms for its global economic governance advocacy.
• South Africa faces diplomatic tensions when continental priorities clash with bloc consensus, such as the UN Security Council reform. South Africa supports the African Ezulwini Consensus (demanding two permanent seats with veto rights), while its IBSA partners, Brazil and India, support the G-4 position (permanent seats without veto rights).
• To maximize its co-chairmanship of FOCAC, South Africa should focus on practical continental governance, including establishing a monitoring and evaluation framework for infrastructure projects and setting a clear agenda for natural resource management based on the African Mining charter to ensure beneficiation at source.

APA

Naidu, S. (2015). South Africa and FOCAC: Enabling a Partnership for Global Economic Governance Beyond the BRICS? South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Policy-Insights-26.pdf

Chicago

Naidu, Sanusha. South Africa and FOCAC: Enabling a Partnership for Global Economic Governance Beyond the BRICS? South African Institute of International Affairs, 2015. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Policy-Insights-26.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Naidu |first1=Sanusha |title=South Africa and FOCAC: Enabling a Partnership for Global Economic Governance Beyond the BRICS? |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=26 October 2015 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Policy-Insights-26.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{naidu2015south, author = {Naidu, Sanusha}, title = {{South Africa and FOCAC: Enabling a Partnership for Global Economic Governance Beyond the BRICS?}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2015}, month = oct, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Policy-Insights-26.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }