Development Aid for Infrastructure Investment in Africa: Malian Relations with China, the European Commission and the World Bank

The paper examines infrastructure funding in Mali, specifically comparing 'traditional' donors (World Bank, European Commission) with 'non-traditional' donors (China). Using the third Bamako bridge as a case study, it argues that recipient governments evaluate aid through an investment model that balances capital costs, transaction costs, and risk profiles. The author finds that while Chinese aid is often perceived as 'tied' and carries higher long-term uncertainty, it is attractive due to low short-term risk and a 'South-South partner' identity. The study concludes that in a stable, resource-poor country like Mali, Chinese aid complements rather than substitutes for OECD aid, meaning it is less likely to undermine established good governance conditions.

• Infrastructure projects with low financial cost recovery, such as bridges and road networks, are typically funded via grants or gifts because poor governments avoid borrowing capital for projects where economic growth is uncertain.
• Recipient governments face significant transaction costs from traditional donors, including evaluation costs, reporting requirements, and delays in payments, which some Malian officials view as a means for donors to retain control.
• Both Chinese and European Commission aid are effectively 'tied', as they restrict contractor eligibility to their own firms or specific groups, which hinders the coordination of multi-donor projects.
• Chinese aid is perceived as more attractive in the short term because it is seen as having lower risk regarding price fluctuations and a more egalitarian approach to professional coexistence compared to European donors.
• While Chinese aid offers low short-term risk, it is associated with higher long-term risk and uncertainty, including potential future requests for resource concessions or political obligations like the One China Policy.
• In the specific context of Mali, Chinese infrastructure aid acts as a supplement to rather than a replacement for OECD aid, suggesting it does not necessarily undermine good governance conditions attached to the majority of aid agreements.

APA

Fletcher, H. (2010). Development Aid for Infrastructure Investment in Africa: Malian Relations with China, the European Commission and the World Bank. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Occasional-Paper-58.pdf

Chicago

Fletcher, Henry. Development Aid for Infrastructure Investment in Africa: Malian Relations with China, the European Commission and the World Bank. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2010. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Occasional-Paper-58.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Fletcher |first1=Henry |title=Development Aid for Infrastructure Investment in Africa: Malian Relations with China, the European Commission and the World Bank |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=April 2010 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Occasional-Paper-58.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{fletcher2010development, author = {Fletcher, Henry}, title = {{Development Aid for Infrastructure Investment in Africa: Malian Relations with China, the European Commission and the World Bank}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2010}, month = apr, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Occasional-Paper-58.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }