Unchecked Executive Powers: Lessons in Effective Government Design

The paper examines the tendency of executive branches in Africa to monopolize power, attributing this to inherited colonial structures and a lack of institutional capacity. It highlights how the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has exposed these governance deficiencies. The author argues that while formal separation of powers exists, it is undermined by political realities and a culture of the 'Big Man'. To counter this, the document advocates for empowering civil society with information to hold the executive accountable and bolstering the independence and resources of the legislature and judiciary.

• Executive dominance in Africa is partly due to the inheritance of colonial structures which were adapted to local cultures without establishing effective restraints on power, leading to the 'Big Man' phenomenon of unchallengeable leaders.
• The executive branch often monopolizes power by controlling the appointment of bureaucrats, heads of watchdog bodies, and the judiciary, and by possessing the power to dissolve the legislature.
• Legislative independence is frequently undermined by executive intimidation, financial constraints, and the presence of overwhelming ruling-party majorities. Specific examples include the use of patronage in Madagascar, Swaziland, and Uganda, and the co-option of members in Ghana.
• The judiciary's ability to check executive power is limited by a lack of independence in appointments and remuneration, which can lead to an 'executive-minded' judiciary susceptible to corruption.
• The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has helped expose governance challenges, such as the lack of respect for constitutionalism and the tendency of the executive to dominate, while empowering citizens by demystifying government operations.
• Effective governance in Africa is hindered by a lack of constitutionalism and the absence of supportive institutional conventions, where loyalty to individuals often outweighs adherence to abstract legal principles.

APA

Mohiddin, A. (2008). Unchecked Executive Powers: Lessons in Effective Government Design. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/Occasional-Paper-1.pdf

Chicago

Mohiddin, Ahmed. Unchecked Executive Powers: Lessons in Effective Government Design. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2008. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/Occasional-Paper-1.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Mohiddin |first1=Ahmed |title=Unchecked Executive Powers: Lessons in Effective Government Design |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=May 2008 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/Occasional-Paper-1.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{mohiddin2008unchecked, author = {Mohiddin, Ahmed}, title = {{Unchecked Executive Powers: Lessons in Effective Government Design}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2008}, month = may, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/Occasional-Paper-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }