occasional-paper-1-450fa736ef755439.pdf

This research paper by Professor Ahmed Mohiddin examines the tendency of executive branches to dominate governance structures in Africa. It analyzes the systemic reasons for this dominance, the capacity failures of legislatures and judiciaries, and the role of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and civil society in establishing effective checks and balances.

• Executive dominance in Africa is partly attributed to the inheritance of colonial governance structures, which were adapted to local cultures without establishing effective restraints on power, leading to the 'Big Man' phenomenon of unchallengeable leaders.
• The executive branch maintains dominance through several mechanisms: controlling the initiation of laws, managing public resources and budgets, appointing heads of watchdog bodies and the judiciary, and possessing the power to dissolve the legislature.
• Legislative independence is frequently undermined by executive intimidation, financial constraints, and the presence of overwhelming ruling-party majorities. Specific examples include the use of junior government portfolios in Ghana to co-opt members and the dominance of the KANU party in Kenya prior to 2002.
• The judiciary's ability to check executive power is limited by a lack of independence and poor effectiveness, often because the executive controls judicial appointments, remuneration, and budgets, leading to an 'executive-minded' judiciary.
• The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has highlighted common governance challenges, including institutional capacity deficiencies and a lack of respect for constitutionalism, while simultaneously empowering citizens and non-state actors by demystifying government operations.
• Effective checks and balances in Africa are hindered not just by a lack of structures, but by a lack of 'constitutionalism,' political will, and the absence of supportive institutional conventions, with some societies prioritizing group loyalty and reciprocity over legality.
• The author argues that the most effective way to constrain executive power is to empower civil society through information and education, enabling citizens to understand government obligations and hold leaders accountable.

APA

South African Institute of International Affairs (n.d.). occasional-paper-1-450fa736ef755439.pdf. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/Occasional-Paper-1.pdf

Chicago

South African Institute of International Affairs. occasional-paper-1-450fa736ef755439.pdf. n.d. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/Occasional-Paper-1.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=occasional-paper-1-450fa736ef755439.pdf |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/Occasional-Paper-1.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairsndoccasionalpaper1450fa736ef755439pdf, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{occasional-paper-1-450fa736ef755439.pdf}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/Occasional-Paper-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }