cari_pb23_chenyunnansilkroadsahelbri-1-ad0bc6c2a4f4cdb8.pdf

This policy brief examines the integration of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into Africa, focusing on the shift from resource trade to infrastructure and industrial cooperation. It highlights the opportunities for regional integration and industrialization, while warning of the financial risks associated with debt-based lending and the need for African governments to ensure project viability and local capacity building.

• The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a strategic shift in China's engagement with Africa, moving from the resource-focused trade of the 2000s toward "infrastructure, industrial cooperation, and connectivity," characterized by the creation of regional economic corridors.
• China's BRI serves domestic goals by allowing the internationalization of its infrastructure firms and providing a way to "offshore excess capacity at home" through the export of Chinese goods and machinery.
• East and North Africa have been the primary focus of the BRI, with Djibouti serving as a hub featuring a naval facility and US$1.8 billion in infrastructure, including a multipurpose port and free trade zone at Doraleh.
• Major railway projects under the BRI include a US$5.3 billion Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) in Kenya connecting Mombasa to Nairobi, and a US$3.4 billion electrified SGR connecting Addis Ababa in Ethiopia to the Port of Djibouti.
• The "information silk road" expands China's digital footprint in Africa through companies like Huawei, ZTE, and China Telecoms, the latter of which established a data center in Djibouti to connect regional hubs in Asia, Europe, and China.
• While the BRI can address Africa's infrastructure gap and support industrialization, it poses significant financial risks due to debt-based finance, which may strain government revenues and "crowd out" other public expenditures.
• The Bagamoyo Deepwater Port in Tanzania, a joint investment with China Merchants Holding, was suspended in 2016 due to a lack of funds, leading the Tanzanian government to give up its equity stake.

APA

South African Institute of International Affairs (n.d.). cari_pb23_chenyunnansilkroadsahelbri-1-ad0bc6c2a4f4cdb8.pdf. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CARI_PB23_CHENYunnanSilkRoadSahelBRI-1.pdf

Chicago

South African Institute of International Affairs. cari_pb23_chenyunnansilkroadsahelbri-1-ad0bc6c2a4f4cdb8.pdf. n.d. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CARI_PB23_CHENYunnanSilkRoadSahelBRI-1.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=cari_pb23_chenyunnansilkroadsahelbri-1-ad0bc6c2a4f4cdb8.pdf |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CARI_PB23_CHENYunnanSilkRoadSahelBRI-1.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairsndcaripb23chenyunnansilkroadsahelbri1ad0bc6c2a4f4cdb8pdf, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{cari\_pb23\_chenyunnansilkroadsahelbri-1-ad0bc6c2a4f4cdb8.pdf}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CARI_PB23_CHENYunnanSilkRoadSahelBRI-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }