Legal protection for Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant matters for nuclear installations everywhere

The document examines the precarious safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, highlighting risks such as loss of offsite power and cooling water. It argues that while customary international law, the Geneva Conventions' Additional Protocols, and the Pelindaba Treaty provide a framework to prohibit attacks on nuclear installations, these norms are often sidelined by political considerations. The author concludes that rather than creating new conventions, the international community must strengthen the enforcement and accountability of existing legal frameworks to prevent nuclear disasters.

• The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) faces significant safety risks due to military activity, including the stationing of Russian military equipment in the turbine hall, shelling of the nitrogen-oxygen station, and damage to reactor buildings and offsite power supplies.
• The most immediate risk to ZNPP is the failure of external power supplies and cooling systems, which could lead to the reactor carrying out its own destruction. The plant has experienced complete loss of connection to offsite power, and the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam on 6 June 2023 significantly dropped water levels in the reservoir used for cooling.
• Protection of nuclear installations during war is primarily governed by customary international law, the Rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit attacks that may cause the release of dangerous forces and severe civilian losses.
• The Pelindaba Treaty is the only binding multilateral treaty that specifically prohibits armed attacks on nuclear installations, though its scope is limited to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
• Existing legal protections are often undermined by vague terminology and political objectives. For example, the Russian Federation withdrew from Additional Protocol I in 2019, and some experts argue that the term 'may' in Article 56 allows for interpretations that could justify certain military operations.
• The document argues against the creation of new legal conventions to protect nuclear sites, suggesting instead that the international community should focus on strengthening the enforcement and accountability of existing frameworks to avoid adding 'undesirable complexity'.

APA

South African Institute of International Affairs (2023). Legal protection for Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant matters for nuclear installations everywhere. https://saiia.org.za/research/legal-protection-for-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-matters-for-nuclear-installations-everywhere/

Chicago

South African Institute of International Affairs. Legal protection for Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant matters for nuclear installations everywhere. 2023. https://saiia.org.za/research/legal-protection-for-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-matters-for-nuclear-installations-everywhere/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=Legal protection for Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant matters for nuclear installations everywhere |date=28 November 2023 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/legal-protection-for-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-matters-for-nuclear-installations-everywhere/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2023legal, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{Legal protection for Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant matters for nuclear installations everywhere}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2023}, month = nov, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/legal-protection-for-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-matters-for-nuclear-installations-everywhere/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }