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The author contends that a 'bad deal' in the Doha round is preferable to 'no deal', as the failure of the WTO's multilateral system would leave developing countries vulnerable to the interests of wealthy nations in bilateral deals. The text outlines specific requirements for resolution, including US domestic subsidy limits of US$20 billion and EU agricultural tariff cuts of 54 percent. For South Africa, the author argues against import substitution and encourages the government to accept industrial tariff reductions to lower costs and promote exports, despite domestic political opposition from COSATU and business sectors.

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  • The failure to reach a Doha round agreement would likely lead to the breakdown of international economic negotiations and the dissolution of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, resulting in trade policy being driven by judicial activism that favors rich nations over poor ones.
  • WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy proposes a 'triangle' of resolutions to unlock the round: the US must limit domestic agricultural subsidies to US$20 billion annually, the EU must cut agricultural tariffs by 54 percent, and major developing countries must agree to a tariff reduction coefficient of 20 for industrial goods, capping maximum bound tariffs at 20 percent.
  • Despite opposition from COSATU and some business elements, the author argues that South Africa should accept substantial industrial tariff reductions because its market is too small for import substitution and cheaper imported inputs are necessary to promote exports.
  • The success of the round depends on the G6 group (US, EU, Brazil, India, Japan, and Australia) concluding the agricultural package quickly to ensure US negotiators can submit it to Congress before George Bush’s trade promotion authority expires.

Cite the original document

APA
South African Institute of International Affairs (2006). The chill winds of Doha. https://saiia.org.za/research/the-chill-winds-of-doha/
Chicago
South African Institute of International Affairs. The chill winds of Doha. 2006. https://saiia.org.za/research/the-chill-winds-of-doha/.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=The chill winds of Doha |date=21 July 2006 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/the-chill-winds-of-doha/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2006chill, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{The chill winds of Doha}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2006}, month = jul, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/the-chill-winds-of-doha/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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