More than elections: what’s really driving protests in Mozambique

This research paper argues that ongoing unrest in Mozambique following the October 2024 general elections is driven by deep-seated socioeconomic grievances and distrust of the ruling Frelimo party, rather than electoral fraud alone. The author highlights systemic issues including high youth unemployment, government corruption—specifically the 'hidden debt scandal'—and a history of electoral misconduct. The paper notes a shift in public action, with protests now targeting private sector companies over land rights and infrastructure failures, and warns that the new government under Daniel Chapo faces significant instability unless a genuine dialogue including opposition figure Venâncio Mondlane is established.

• While the October general elections sparked public demonstrations, the primary drivers of unrest are declining standards of living and dissatisfaction with the Frelimo party, which has governed since 1975. Youth prospects are particularly poor, with those aged 18-35 identifying rising unemployment and lack of access to electricity and water as the most critical problems.
• Mozambique faces severe developmental challenges, ranking 177th out of 183 on the 2023 Global Youth Development Index and 183rd out of 193 on the 2024 Human Development Index. Poverty levels increased from 46% to 65% over the last decade, a trend the government attributes to lower economic growth between 2015 and 2023, which reduced investment and the capacity to fund social programs.
• Government corruption has severely hampered economic recovery, most notably through a 'hidden debt scandal' between 2013 and 2014 where officials created state-owned enterprises to take on $2.2 billion in undisclosed debt. This led to a sovereign default, currency collapse, and the temporary suspension of support from the World Bank and IMF. Growth is further undermined by private sector tax avoidance and political patronage.
• The ruling party Frelimo is accused of using the electoral system to maintain power through secrecy and fraud, a pattern noted by the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP) over 25 years. Recent unrest was intensified by a violent police response resulting in over 300 deaths and the October 18, 2024, assassination of a Podemos candidate and lawyer for Venâncio Mondlane.
• Public frustration has expanded beyond politics to target private companies for failing to meet obligations. Examples include protests against the Irish company Kenmare in Nampula province over a promised bridge, French company TotalEnergies in Cabo Delgado over land rights, and Chinese company Desheng Port in Gaza province over electrification.

APA

South African Institute of International Affairs (2025). More than elections: what’s really driving protests in Mozambique. https://saiia.org.za/research/more-than-elections-whats-really-driving-protests-in-mozambique/

Chicago

South African Institute of International Affairs. More than elections: what’s really driving protests in Mozambique. 2025. https://saiia.org.za/research/more-than-elections-whats-really-driving-protests-in-mozambique/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=More than elections: what’s really driving protests in Mozambique |date=27 February 2025 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/more-than-elections-whats-really-driving-protests-in-mozambique/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2025more, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{More than elections: what’s really driving protests in Mozambique}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2025}, month = feb, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/more-than-elections-whats-really-driving-protests-in-mozambique/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }