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The research paper examines 'le glissement' (slippage), the strategy used by President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo to delay elections and extend his mandate beyond December 2016. The author argues that Kabila's appointment of a non-inclusive government and his disregard for the December 2016 agreement have fueled widespread demonstrations and insecurity. This instability creates a cycle that further justifies electoral delays. The document critiques the UN Security Council's decision to reduce MONUSCO troop levels despite rising violence in the Kasai and eastern regions, and notes that while South Africa has the logistical experience and diplomatic ties to assist, its commitment to non-interference and close relationship with Kabila may hinder its effectiveness as a mediator.

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  • President Joseph Kabila has employed a strategy of 'le glissement' (slippage) to remain in power past the official end of his mandate in December 2016 by repeatedly delaying elections.
  • The opposition argues that Kabila's appointment of a new government in May and the selection of Bruno Tshibala as prime minister violate the 31 December 2016 agreement, which stipulated a transition government and elections in late-2017.
  • The UN's MONUSCO mission is facing severe strain as conflict displaces 4,600 people daily, with 3.7 million internally displaced persons recorded by March 2017, and significant violence occurring in the Kasai region and eastern Congo.
  • Despite the increasing instability, the UN Security Council voted on 31 March to reduce the troop ceiling by 3,600 military personnel and requested an exit strategy for MONUSCO.
  • South Africa has a history of providing significant logistical and financial support for DRC elections, including spending R666 million ($52 million) in 2006, but its current influence is limited by a policy of non-interference and a close relationship between President Jacob Zuma and President Kabila.

Cite the original document

APA
South African Institute of International Affairs (2017). Dangerous slippage in the DRC. https://saiia.org.za/research/dangerous-slippage-in-the-drc/
Chicago
South African Institute of International Affairs. Dangerous slippage in the DRC. 2017. https://saiia.org.za/research/dangerous-slippage-in-the-drc/.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=Dangerous slippage in the DRC |date=20 June 2017 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/dangerous-slippage-in-the-drc/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2017dangerous, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{Dangerous slippage in the DRC}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2017}, month = jun, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/dangerous-slippage-in-the-drc/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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