Threats and Coercive Diplomacy: An Ethical Analysis

The authors examine the morality of coercive diplomacy, distinguishing between deterrent and compellent threats. They argue that while threats are less harmful than actual force, they are not morally neutral and must be assessed via just war principles including just cause, proportionality, legitimate authority, and right intention.

• Threats are classified as a hybrid speech act combining 'commissives' (commitments to action) and 'directives' (attempts to get the hearer to do something). This distinguishes them from warnings, which are 'assertives' that do not commit the speaker to a further action.
• The authors distinguish between two primary types of coercive threats: deterrent threats, which aim to keep an adversary from starting an action, and compellent threats, which aim to make an adversary perform an action they otherwise would not.
• Compellent threats differ from deterrent threats in their dynamic of initiative; compellence typically requires the threatener to make the first move, often through calibrated increments of harm, whereas deterrence is passive, leaving the decision to the threatened party.
• Regarding 'just cause,' the authors argue that whenever there is a just cause for the use of force, there is also a just cause to issue a threat. However, they contend it is morally wrong to sincerely threaten an action that would be impermissible to carry out, as the conditional intention to do wrong is itself a wrong.
• In terms of 'ad bellum proportionality,' the authors suggest that a threat may be morally acceptable even if the actual attack would be disproportionate, because the harm of a threat is lesser than the harm of physical implementation. This gap is more pronounced in deterrence than in compellence.
• The authors critique 'studied ambiguity'—the practice of leaving threats vague to maintain flexibility—arguing it is morally worrisome because it requires preparations for implementation that increase the risk of accidental or miscalculated escalation.
• Legitimate authority in the context of threats requires that the issuer has moral and legal standing beyond mere military power, is relevantly involved in the matter, and ideally acts as part of a larger alliance to enhance perceived legitimacy.
• The criterion of 'right intention' dictates that a legitimate threat must be issued with a sincere desire to avoid carrying it out. Using threats as a pretext to provoke an adversary into attacking first is considered a violation of this principle.

APA

Reichberg, G. M., & Syse, H. (n.d.). Threats and Coercive Diplomacy: An Ethical Analysis. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/9ab16f46-8d97-4e55-85e4-01d1131b95ce/Threats and Coercive Diplomacy An Ethical Analysis.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Reichberg, Gregory M., and Henrik Syse. Threats and Coercive Diplomacy: An Ethical Analysis. Peace Research Institute Oslo, n.d. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/9ab16f46-8d97-4e55-85e4-01d1131b95ce/Threats and Coercive Diplomacy An Ethical Analysis.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Reichberg |first1=Gregory M. |last2=Syse |first2=Henrik |title=Threats and Coercive Diplomacy: An Ethical Analysis |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/9ab16f46-8d97-4e55-85e4-01d1131b95ce/Threats and Coercive Diplomacy An Ethical Analysis.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{reichbergndthreats, author = {Reichberg, Gregory M. and Syse, Henrik}, title = {{Threats and Coercive Diplomacy: An Ethical Analysis}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/9ab16f46-8d97-4e55-85e4-01d1131b95ce/Threats and Coercive Diplomacy An Ethical Analysis.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }