Can Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution Be Made To Satisfy Ethnic Aspirations?

The document argues that Myanmar's 2008 constitution fails to meet the aspirations of ethnic minorities due to the military's institutionalized dominance and the rejection of federalism. It highlights that the military's 25% control of parliament allows it to block the three-fourths majority required for amendments. While the creation of regional and state assemblies offers a potential path for internal self-governance, these bodies currently lack real power and funding. The authors suggest that a long-term strategy of gradual amendments, starting with increasing the financial and administrative powers of local assemblies, is more realistic than immediate tripartite negotiations or formal parliamentary processes.

• The 2008 constitution was designed by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to ensure the military maintains a permanent political role and ultimate power through a 'roadmap to discipline-flourishing democracy'.
• The military (Tatmadaw) possesses significant constitutional prerogatives, including appointing 25% of members to both national parliamentary chambers and one-third of state and regional parliaments.
• The military can effectively block any constitutional amendments because the process requires a three-fourths majority in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, and the military controls 25% of the seats.
• The constitution rejects federalism and the right to internal self-determination, prioritizing the 'non-disintegration of the Union' and national sovereignty over ethnic-minority aspirations.
• While the 2008 constitution established seven regional and seven state hluttaws, these bodies lack substantive power, limited budgets, and their chief ministers are appointed by the president rather than the assemblies.
• The authors identify three potential paths for constitutional change: formal parliamentary proposals, tripartite negotiations between the government, NLD, and ethnic organizations, or a long-term strategy of postponement and gradual amendments.
• A feasible starting point for reform would be increasing the financial and administrative powers of state and regional assemblies, such as allocating natural resource revenues to local levels.

APA

Nilsen, M., & Tønnesson, S. (2012). Can Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution Be Made To Satisfy Ethnic Aspirations? Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/efd50237-27fc-4e19-a5f7-3571fb1a0df1/Nilsen-Tonnesson-Myanmars-2008-Constitution-PRIO-Policy-Brief-11-2012.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Nilsen, Marte, and Stein Tønnesson. Can Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution Be Made To Satisfy Ethnic Aspirations? Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2012. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/efd50237-27fc-4e19-a5f7-3571fb1a0df1/Nilsen-Tonnesson-Myanmars-2008-Constitution-PRIO-Policy-Brief-11-2012.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Nilsen |first1=Marte |last2=Tønnesson |first2=Stein |title=Can Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution Be Made To Satisfy Ethnic Aspirations? |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=2012 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/efd50237-27fc-4e19-a5f7-3571fb1a0df1/Nilsen-Tonnesson-Myanmars-2008-Constitution-PRIO-Policy-Brief-11-2012.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{nilsen2012can, author = {Nilsen, Marte and Tønnesson, Stein}, title = {{Can Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution Be Made To Satisfy Ethnic Aspirations?}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2012}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/efd50237-27fc-4e19-a5f7-3571fb1a0df1/Nilsen-Tonnesson-Myanmars-2008-Constitution-PRIO-Policy-Brief-11-2012.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }